Yeah, Ukraine not being in NATO and still being able to hold its own against Russian air attacks even immediately after the invasion is quite telling of Russia's air capabilities should they decide to go for the Baltics who are all in NATO. It'd be like using an electric fly-swatter at that point.
Yes, and the main point here is that Russian VKS limitations aren't just merely "bad execution" in Ukraine, but a big structural and doctrinal SNAFU.
However, I am not sure if a Baltic flight wouldn't be less about classic air superiority and more about time, suppression and politics. The first 120 hours of operation might be crucial for them until NATO fully mobilizes, but then again I have a feeling that our SIGINT would pick up any serious strike preparations well ahead of it happening.
Thanks Marcin for your comment. There is now a solid body of public reporting on how Western services sought to generate early warning well in advance, particularly as Russia began to display indicators that could be interpreted as invasion preparations.
Two good pieces worth reading:
How Estonia’s Military Intelligence Secretly Helped Ukraine
Yes, and it's an interesting case where the bearer of bad news is executed by the king. And this further reinforces the point that, especially now, we would know about an upcoming strike in advance.
Author believe in dogfights WWII style. But in reality there is almost none in current RU-UA war, and it would be even less in case of Baltic invasion. If NATO planes would attack deep into RU territory, they would face AA missiles, and planes would scramble to intercept only on their way back - exactly because they cannot stand in equal fight. At the same time RU would not fly into NATO-controlled territory but instead throw hundreds of gliding bombs outside of NATO AA range, and old planes can do this perfectly well. You can see all of this in real time over Ukraine, after all.
I agree with your assessment regarding the limited air-to-air engagement between the Ukrainian Air Force and the operational-tactical aviation of the Aerospace Forces.
Based on Ukrainian pilot accounts, the current pattern is largely explained by Ukraine’s limited ability to engage Russian fighters on equal terms. Constraints in radar performance, missile capability, and overall integration make sustained counter-air operations difficult. That reality shapes behaviour on both sides.
A confrontation with NATO would be structurally different. NATO’s integrated air combat system combines ISR, airborne early warning, electronic warfare, suppression of enemy air defences, and advanced fighter capabilities in a far more comprehensive architecture. The interaction would therefore be unlikely to remain balanced in the same way and would likely favour NATO.
Your point on glide bombs is a strong one. They do not require highly sophisticated airframes. The decisive variable is protection. If covering fighters cannot reliably secure the airspace, the bombing platforms themselves become vulnerable.
Yeah, Ukraine not being in NATO and still being able to hold its own against Russian air attacks even immediately after the invasion is quite telling of Russia's air capabilities should they decide to go for the Baltics who are all in NATO. It'd be like using an electric fly-swatter at that point.
Yes, and the main point here is that Russian VKS limitations aren't just merely "bad execution" in Ukraine, but a big structural and doctrinal SNAFU.
However, I am not sure if a Baltic flight wouldn't be less about classic air superiority and more about time, suppression and politics. The first 120 hours of operation might be crucial for them until NATO fully mobilizes, but then again I have a feeling that our SIGINT would pick up any serious strike preparations well ahead of it happening.
Thanks Marcin for your comment. There is now a solid body of public reporting on how Western services sought to generate early warning well in advance, particularly as Russia began to display indicators that could be interpreted as invasion preparations.
Two good pieces worth reading:
How Estonia’s Military Intelligence Secretly Helped Ukraine
https://vsquare.org/how-estonias-military-intelligence-secretly-helped-ukraine/
A war foretold: how the CIA and MI6 got hold of Putin’s Ukraine plans and why nobody believed them
https://www.theguardian.com/world/ng-interactive/2026/feb/20/a-war-foretold-cia-mi6-putin-ukraine-plans-russia
Yes, and it's an interesting case where the bearer of bad news is executed by the king. And this further reinforces the point that, especially now, we would know about an upcoming strike in advance.
Author believe in dogfights WWII style. But in reality there is almost none in current RU-UA war, and it would be even less in case of Baltic invasion. If NATO planes would attack deep into RU territory, they would face AA missiles, and planes would scramble to intercept only on their way back - exactly because they cannot stand in equal fight. At the same time RU would not fly into NATO-controlled territory but instead throw hundreds of gliding bombs outside of NATO AA range, and old planes can do this perfectly well. You can see all of this in real time over Ukraine, after all.
Thank you Kryga for your thoughtful comment.
I agree with your assessment regarding the limited air-to-air engagement between the Ukrainian Air Force and the operational-tactical aviation of the Aerospace Forces.
Based on Ukrainian pilot accounts, the current pattern is largely explained by Ukraine’s limited ability to engage Russian fighters on equal terms. Constraints in radar performance, missile capability, and overall integration make sustained counter-air operations difficult. That reality shapes behaviour on both sides.
A confrontation with NATO would be structurally different. NATO’s integrated air combat system combines ISR, airborne early warning, electronic warfare, suppression of enemy air defences, and advanced fighter capabilities in a far more comprehensive architecture. The interaction would therefore be unlikely to remain balanced in the same way and would likely favour NATO.
Your point on glide bombs is a strong one. They do not require highly sophisticated airframes. The decisive variable is protection. If covering fighters cannot reliably secure the airspace, the bombing platforms themselves become vulnerable.