Russia Lacks the Air Power to Support a Baltic Invasion

NATO holds aerospace superiority over Russia in the Baltic region

By Andreas Turunen
Mellenion

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The conduct of air war by the Russian Aerospace Forces in Ukraine has been often interpreted by Western experts as an operational failure. The central argument is that Russia has been unable to acquire air supremacy over Ukraine, having failed to destroy Ukraine’s air force and air defences. Since air power is widely regarded as the entry ticket to modern warfare, this assessment has become critical to Western audiences evaluating the current and future threat posed by the Russian Aerospace Forces against Western militaries.

Yet no shared view has emerged within Western analytical communities regarding the precise shortcomings of the Russian Aerospace Forces in Ukraine. This debate is directly relevant to frequently discussed scenarios in which the Russian Armed Forces invade the Baltic States. According to some recent assessments, Russia could conduct a sudden invasion and secure control over Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. After the initial operation, it could threaten NATO with nuclear weapons and pressure political leadership not to invoke Article 5 and to initiate a common response.

In reality, Russia would not enjoy a significant advantage in challenging NATO through an invasion of the Baltic States. The primary risk for Moscow lies in the relative weakness of the Russian Aerospace Forces when measured against stronger, modern and joint-capable NATO air forces. In a real combat situation, Russia would risk losing air supremacy from the earliest stages of conflict and would eventually be unable to protect its ground forces from Western air power.

Russia’s Approach to Air Warfare in the Baltic States

It is often argued that the poor performance of the Russian Aerospace Forces in the initial stages of the war in Ukraine resulted from flawed or insufficient intelligence provided by Russian intelligence and security services. A second explanation suggests that the Russian Aerospace Forces Staff was incapable of proper planning, leading to the inability of Operational-Tactical Aviation to degrade Ukraine’s air defences effectively.

However, Russian military thinkers had already recognised before the war that the Russian Aerospace Forces were incapable of conducting a large-scale air and air defence operation in a regional war. Russian air and air defence doctrinal thinking differs markedly from the Western perspective, being rooted in the support of ground warfare in an operational direction. It is therefore possible that the Russian Aerospace Forces did not pursue an air operation aligned with Western standards, because such standards do not exist in Russian doctrine.

One key characteristic of the war in Ukraine, as described by Russian military thinkers, has been the supremacy of air defences over aircraft. Since the start of the war, the Russian Aerospace Forces have adapted by prioritising the protection of airframes and avoiding entry into Ukraine’s air defence zones, primarily provided by Western partners.

These conclusions carry two consequences:

First, the future role of Operational-Tactical Aviation may be reduced to serving as a launch platform for long-range precision munitions and missiles from within Russia’s own air defence coverage.

Second, in the reconstruction of the Russian Armed Forces after the War in Ukraine, strengthening strategic air defence may be prioritised over investment in aerial platforms.

A hypothetical future war between NATO and the Russian Armed Forces beginning in the Baltic region would not resemble the war in Ukraine. Based on lessons learned, a revised Russian air and air defence approach to support an invasion of the Baltic States would likely include several characteristics.

A strategic air defence-centric approach would see Russia concentrate long-range strategic air defence assets close to the Baltic States and extend the maximum range of systems to cover Baltic airspace.

Operational-Tactical Aviation would play a limited role, avoiding NATO air defence engagement zones and remaining within Russian strategic air defence coverage while launching long-range air-to-air and air-to-ground munitions from distance.

Russia would also increase emphasis on reconnaissance-strike capabilities and unmanned systems, conducting joint strikes from air, ground and sea-based assets alongside long-range drones of the Unmanned Systems Troops. The primary targets would be air bases, logistical hubs and command centres of NATO member states in the Baltic Sea region.

Factors Affecting the Outcome of a Potential Invasion

The first limitation Russia would face is numerical. Some estimates suggest that approximately 250–300 Operational-Tactical Aviation aircraft are currently allocated to the War in Ukraine. Any hostile action against NATO would require significantly more combat-capable aircraft, not only to contest airspace over the Baltic States but also to deter and repel strikes against the Kola peninsula, the Saint Petersburg area, Kaliningrad, Moscow and Belarus. By comparison, the Nordic states alone, all members of NATO, possess more than 200 modern combat aircraft.

The second obstacle concerns qualitative advantage. NATO countries in the Baltic Sea region operate well-integrated air and air defence systems with established joint operability between platforms and nations. The Agile Combat Employment (ACE) concept enables rapid and flexible projection of allied air power.

Western air forces field a considerable number of technologically advanced aircraft, including fourth- and fifth-generation fighters with the latest life-cycle upgrades and stealth-capable platforms. To challenge this, Russia would require not merely greater numbers but specifically its most capable fighter aviation aircraft, including Su-35S (FLANKER-M), Su-30SM2 (FLANKER-H) and Su-57 (FELON). Outdated systems would have negligible impact against modern NATO aircraft due to inferior radars and air-to-air missiles.

The same dynamic applies to strategic air defence. In Western defence discourse, the concept of layered air defence under the designation A2/AD (Anti-Access/Area-Denial) is often depicted through maximum-range engagement zones spanning the Baltic States, implying that Russia could deny NATO air operations in the region.

In practice, strategic air defence systems cannot maintain impenetrable denial zones indefinitely without risking suppression and destruction by Western long-range high-precision munitions. All air defence systems are inherently vulnerable to long-range precision strike; they do not require direct overflight to be neutralised.

To preserve high-value systems such as the S-400, Russia would need to position them beyond the range of Western ground-based launch systems, including ATACMS and MLRS. This would reduce their effective coverage significantly, limiting their capacity to threaten NATO air forces over Baltic airspace.

In addition, US air strikes against Iran’s nuclear programme provided evidence of the capability of stealth-capable fighters to conduct suppression of enemy air defence (SEAD) and operate within monitored airspace.

A significant threat to Western air forces would nonetheless arise from Russian long-range strike capabilities, including ground-based missile systems and the Unmanned Systems Troops. Since the beginning of the War in Ukraine, Russia has refined its conduct of strikes by combining missile and drone attacks in coordinated efforts.

Western air forces, however, possess countermeasures. Strategic depth and dispersed runways enable flexible deployment. Air-to-air refuelling mitigates range and payload constraints, enabling strikes from longer distances. Airborne interception can neutralise missiles and drones in flight, while Western air-to-ground capabilities allow strikes against launch positions before munitions are fired.

Information and intelligence superiority, as acknowledged by both Western and Russian analysts, would further complicate Russian preparations. Concentrating sufficient ground, air and sea-based assets without detection would be difficult under sustained monitoring of Russian military activity.

During the preparatory stages of the war in Ukraine, the United States provided detailed public information concerning Russian intentions. A similar pattern would likely emerge if Russia began deploying forces near the Baltic States. This would afford Western air forces time to reinforce the region, deter aggression and contest air supremacy from the outset.

Another limiting factor for Russia is Western standoff air-to-ground strike capability, which differs markedly from Ukraine’s. Russian military experts recognise that Western air forces possess a wide range of precision-guided munitions capable of targeting the ground infrastructure of the Russian Aerospace Forces.

In practical terms, Russia would need to calculate carefully from what distance Operational-Tactical Aviation could operate without risking catastrophic losses in the early stages of conflict. Increased distance from the frontline would reduce available time on station and payload for missions such as sustained air patrols with full missile loads.

Outcome and Conclusion

Russia would face a significant risk of military defeat in any invasion scenario against the Baltic States due to the disparity in air power between NATO and the Russian Aerospace Forces. A rapid advance supported by long-range strikes and drones would likely encounter well-prepared and superior Western air forces capable of achieving air supremacy and degrading Russian combat potential both at the frontline and in the rear.

Misunderstandings about the limitations of Western air power partly reflect experiences from Afghanistan and Iraq, where extensive air-to-ground strikes against low-priority targets revealed limitations in asymmetric warfare contexts. Modern Western air power, however, is designed for confrontation with conventional armed forces, targeting weapon platforms, organisations, command and control systems and combat support elements.

The NATO and Russian views on the conventional balance of power in the aerospace domain are largely aligned. Both consider the aerospace domain decisive in contemporary and future warfare and understand that NATO holds superiority in this domain. The divergence lies primarily in political and public discourse in the West, where perceptions of vulnerability in conventional warfare against Russia are persistent. ֍

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