Russia’s State Armament Programme: Strategic Priorities for the Next Decade
How Russia plans to prioritise strategic nuclear forces, integrated air defence, and long-range precision strike
By Juuso Eskonmaa
Mellenion
Russia’s Minister of Defence outlined a framework for developing the country’s future military capabilities on 17 December 2025. In his address, Belousov presented the main directions of the State Armament Programme (Государственная программа вооружения) for 2027–2036. The programme defines Russia’s military procurement priorities for the next decade, based on assessments of future armed conflicts and military threats.
The speech also signalled a shift in procurement philosophy. According to Belousov:
“The State Armament Programme must be formed on the basis of requirements for the prospective combat capabilities of the Armed Forces, rather than on the number of items of weapons and equipment.”
Belousov frames the Russian Ministry of Defence’s priority for the coming years as modernising the Armed Forces and raising their technological level. To achieve this, the State Armament Programme will prioritise modern, high-technology systems related to strategic nuclear forces, air and missile defence, and space-based capabilities. Electronic warfare, command-and-control, and unmanned systems are also included in the priority list. He states that nearly half of the State Armament Programme’s funding will be allocated to these high-priority categories.
This article continues my analysis of Belousov’s address from 17 December 2025. The first part examined what the remarks suggested about Russia’s priorities in the war in Ukraine; you can read it here.
A capability-based procurement philosophy
The change in procurement priorities, from quantitative goals to capability-based procurement, is the most important shift indicated in the speech.
Belousov illustrates this approach with three examples of priority capability requirements meant to guide the development of the Russian Armed Forces:
For the Strategic Nuclear Forces, the priority is the ability to overcome the missile defence system of a potential adversary.
For air defence, the priority capability is repelling aerial attacks.
For space assets, the priority is ensuring detailed intelligence, high-speed communications, and providing navigation data for the use of high-precision munitions.
Publicly identified by Belousov as priorities, these capabilities are likely to shape the strategic focus and military procurement of the Russian Armed Forces over the coming decade.
Overcoming the missile defence system of a potential adversary
The requirement for the Strategic Nuclear Forces to overcome a potential adversary’s missile defence system is directly connected to Russia’s system of strategic deterrence. A central concept in Russian deterrence doctrine is the ability to inflict “unacceptable damage” (неприемлемый ущерб) on an opponent in a large-scale war.
Russia’s nuclear modernisation efforts are shaped in part by long-standing concerns that U.S. ballistic missile defence could erode the credibility of its retaliatory capability. Preserving an assured and credible nuclear second-strike capability therefore remains a central priority for the Russian Armed Forces, with the United States as the primary strategic adversary.
Russia is likely to invest in sustained efforts to bypass missile defences. Previously, Russia’s nuclear modernisation programme has included continued development and upgrading of intercontinental ballistic missiles of the Yars family, as well as the development of hypersonic glide vehicles such as the “Avangard” system, which has greater manoeuvrability in flight. It has also included Burevestnik, a nuclear-powered, nuclear-armed land-attack cruise missile with intercontinental range, whose actual capabilities and viability remain in question.
In the naval domain, Russia is developing Poseidon, a nuclear-powered, nuclear-armed autonomous underwater system intended to threaten coastal targets while bypassing existing missile-defence systems. However, it is unlikely Poseidon is currently operational.
This dynamic is also linked to ongoing efforts in the United States to develop next-generation layered missile-defence architectures, referred to as the Golden Dome by the US administration. Although this capability remains largely conceptual, such systems are intended to intercept ballistic, hypersonic, and cruise missiles in flight and may influence the strategic balance over the next decade.
From Moscow’s perspective, expanding missile defence architectures could increase pressure to preserve penetration capability, potentially including means to disrupt space-based sensors through electronic warfare, cyber means, or other counter-space capabilities. This might influence the systems developed and procured under the State Armament Programme.
The air defence as a central priority
Air and missile defence are prioritised within the procurement programme. The war in Ukraine has demonstrated a sharp increase in the scale and frequency of aerial attacks, particularly through the widespread use of unmanned aerial vehicles of varying ranges and payloads alongside cruise missiles. Russian planners are likely to expect this trend to persist and expand in future conflicts, reinforcing the emphasis on strengthening air-defence capabilities in the State Armament Programme.
Roughly 80 percent of NATO firepower is air delivered, which helps explain why air-defence systems remain a critical priority for Russia in any potential conflict with NATO. The experiences from the war in Ukraine, together with assessments of NATO air-strike capabilities, are likely to be defining factors in prioritising air defence in military procurement.
The emphasis on air defence is likely to be reflected in the development of the Ground Forces, whose air-defence units are designed to protect manoeuvring formations. Another critical capability is strategic air defence, operated by the Russian Aerospace Forces, which is designed to provide wide-area coverage and protect strategically important military installations and critical infrastructure.
When outlining priorities in strategic air defence, Belousov described in his speech the creation of a PVO-PRO division within the Russian Aerospace Forces, integrating air- and missile-defence capabilities within a single formation. He stated that the first regiment has entered operational duty. Its principal system is the S-500 SAM system, which reportedly can engage targets in near space.
The objective of “forming a universal air-defence system” (формирование универсальной системы противовоздушной обороны) has been linked to the forthcoming State Armament Programme. This formulation did not appear in Belousov’s Collegium speech but was attributed to President Vladimir Putin in remarks reported from a separate meeting related to defence procurement. Information about the “universal” air-defence system remains limited, but the phrasing is worth examination.
The term formation (формирование) used in this context likely refers to organising or integrating existing capabilities and systems. The phrase therefore appears to indicate an objective of integrating and harmonising air- and missile-defence assets into a more unified air-defence network.
This approach would be consistent with broader trends in Russian military thought, including efforts to build integrated command-and-control architectures under the concept of a “Unified Information Space” (Единое информационное пространство), aimed at linking sensors, targeting data, and automated decision-support systems across the Russian Armed Forces.
Expansion of space-based capabilities
Belousov identifies space assets as a priority capability requirement for the State Armament Programme. They are intended to provide detailed intelligence, high-speed communications, and navigation data to enable long-range precision strikes. Within the outlined capability-based planning framework, these capabilities are seen as critical enablers for the Russian Armed Forces, supporting long-range strikes that are increasingly central in Russian military thinking for generating strategic effects.
One of the key surprises for Russian military planners in the war in Ukraine has been the information and intelligence advantage Ukraine has been able to achieve with the help of Western countries. The space-based intelligence and communications capabilities that the United States and European countries have provided to Ukraine have been employed effectively for high-precision strikes against Russian forces and assets in occupied territory, in the Black Sea, and deep inside Russian territory. Russian planners are likely to view NATO’s advantages in this sphere as a priority gap to narrow through the development and procurement of new space-based assets.
Expanding space-based capabilities would also support the integration of air and missile defence and strategic deterrence. Russia appears to be pursuing a more resilient space architecture capable of sustaining communications, navigation, and sensors in a contested environment. From the perspective of the Russian Ministry of Defence, this is likely a critical component of Russia’s ability to remain competitive in high-technology conflicts over the next decade and beyond.
Conclusion
The priorities Belousov outlined point to a State Armament Programme centered on strategic capabilities rather than numerical objectives. The implied reference case for deterrence and warfighting remains a large-scale war against the US and NATO, and the capability requirements he chose to highlight are consistent with this scenario.
From Moscow’s perspective, credible deterrence and warfighting in such a conflict depend on maintaining the effectiveness of the Strategic Nuclear Forces, building a more integrated air and missile defence architecture, and enabling long-range precision strike through space-based intelligence, communications, and navigation support. These themes suggest that the upcoming State Armament Programme is designed to strengthen Russia’s ability to operate in a contested aerospace environment and generate strategic effects at long-ranges.
At the same time, an emphasis on high-technology and innovation at the rhetorical level does not rule out Ground Forces rearmament. Russia is likely to continue procuring and modernising ground-force equipment, including armoured platforms, as it rebuilds and reorganises formations after the war in Ukraine. The establishment of Leningrad and Moscow Military Districts, and the expansion of their units into divisional structures, creates demands that the procurement programme will have to address.
However, the Ground Forces and the whole Armed Forces effectiveness in modern warfare increasingly depends on enabling capabilities: electronic warfare, layered air defences, resilient communications, and space-based reconnaissance and targeting. In addition, equipping and scaling the Unmanned Systems Troops should be expected as a priority.
Whether the State Armament Programme translates into real capabilities will likely depend on the trajectory and outcome of the war in Ukraine, as well as Russia’s economic capacity, defence-industry labour constraints, the depth of its technological manufacturing base, and the effects of sanctions and supply-chain restrictions.
The State Armament Programme is still in its formative phase, but the main directions are already visible in strategic signalling: capability-based planning, prioritisation of strategic systems, and a push toward integrated aerospace defence and space-assets enabling long-range precision strike. They are indicators of how Russia intends to fight and conduct deterrence in the 2030s, and they warrant sustained attention as the programme moves from intent to implementation. ֍
The full transcript and video of the speech are available in Russian, published by the Kremlin: http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/78801.
Do they have the resources to achieve all of this? It sounds rather ambitious
This is a very ambitions set of goals to pursue, seems they might need a healthy spike in oil prices. I’m also not see the T-14 Armata here…