How Would Russia React to NATO Nuclear Weapons in Finland?
Changes in Finnish legislation could enable the deployment of nuclear weapons in Finland during a crisis. This will likely lead to Russia adjusting its nuclear deterrence posture.
By Juuso Eskonmaa
Mellenion
The Finnish government announced its intention to remove legal restrictions on the deployment of nuclear weapons on Finnish territory. This deployment could be implemented in specific defence-related scenarios. Although the timetable for the legislative changes is currently unknown, they would mark a significant shift in Finnish foreign and security policy. The changes are presented as necessary for Finland’s integration into NATO, enabling the country to participate fully in NATO nuclear deterrence policy.
This article explains the context and outlines the scenarios in which nuclear deployment on Finnish territory would be possible. It also examines the potential Russian responses to the upcoming legislative changes and deployment of nuclear weapons in Finland during a crisis.
Regardless of its heated rhetoric and protests, Russia’s influence on Finnish decision-making is limited. Russia could, however, make adjustments to its nuclear deterrence posture in peacetime and during a crisis in response to Finnish decisions related to nuclear weapons.
Finland and NATO’s nuclear deterrence
Finnish Defence Minister Antti Häkkänen has announced that Finland will make legislative changes to allow the deployment of nuclear weapons on Finnish territory. He noted that the existing restrictions are not aligned with Finland’s requirements as a NATO member. Under the proposed framework, the transport of nuclear weapons into Finland would be permitted in situations related to military defence.
President Alexander Stubb has supported the legislative changes and described NATO deterrence as resting on three pillars: “conventional forces, missiles and nuclear weapons”. In his view, it is in Finland’s interest that there are no legislative restrictions on any of them.
Finland is not seeking to permanently host nuclear weapons on its territory, nor will NATO peacetime nuclear exercises involve deploying nuclear weapons in Finland. The possibility of deploying nuclear weapons on Finnish territory is related to NATO nuclear deterrence and the flexible adjustment of the deterrence posture according to the perceived level of threat.
The decision to deploy nuclear weapons on Finnish territory could be taken in a situation involving the threat of military conflict between Russia and NATO in the Nordic-Baltic region or Eastern Europe. The temporary deployment of nuclear weapons in Finland, or their transport through Finnish airspace, would strengthen NATO’s nuclear deterrence posture to prevent Russia from attacking a NATO member state.
NATO’s non-strategic nuclear weapons
As the ultimate guarantee of security, NATO nuclear deterrence policy relies on the strategic nuclear forces of the United States, as well as the independent strategic nuclear capabilities of France and the United Kingdom. However, the Finnish policy change is not related to strategic nuclear weapons. Instead, they are most likely related to the non-strategic nuclear weapons that the United States has forward deployed in Europe and which are part of NATO’s nuclear deterrence posture.
About 100 non-strategic nuclear gravity bombs B61 (versions −3 and −4) are thought to be deployed at six bases in five European countries: Aviano and Ghedi in Italy; Büchel in Germany; Incirlik in Turkey; Kleine Brogel in Belgium; and Volkel in the Netherlands. These countries have permanent storage of U.S. nuclear weapons and they participate in U.S. nuclear sharing.
These NATO non-strategic nuclear weapons can be launched from U.S. or certain allied aircraft. Several NATO member states have dual-capable aircraft that can deliver the nuclear weapons to their targets if necessary. As described by NATO, the aircraft are available for “nuclear roles at various levels of readiness”.
Therefore, the most likely way for the deployment of nuclear weapons in Finland would involve non-strategic nuclear weapons carried by U.S. or allied aircraft in the context of heightened tensions and the need for enhanced nuclear deterrence and strategic signalling.
Russia’s reactions to the Finnish policy change
Russia has already reacted to the possible Finnish legislative changes with sharp statements. The Russian statements are likely to have limited influence on the decisions currently being made in Finland. The Russian statements are most likely aimed at influencing the Finnish military-political leadership, the government, and public opinion. They are also likely intended to create a sense of danger and uncertainty around Finnish decision-making.
The press secretary of the Russian president, Dmitri Peskov, has stated that the “Finnish announcement leads to escalation of tensions in Europe; and if such plans are implemented, Russia will take corresponding measures”. He also stated that the deployment of nuclear weapons in Finland would be interpreted as a “direct threat” to Russia.
In the Russian Duma, deputy Andrei Kolesnik has framed the possibility of the deployment or transit of nuclear weapons in Finland, closer to Russia’s border, as “an act of aggression against Moscow”. In another interview, Kolesnik stated that “Finland is increasing the level of tensions from their side. I think that our armed forces will look more carefully towards Finland, because it is already directly on our borders” and that “the Russian military capabilities directed at Finland will increase. We cannot tolerate nuclear weapons on our borders”.
Kolesnik’s strongly worded statements seem to indicate a desire to expand military capabilities near Finland further. However, Russia is already struggling to implement the current plans for military expansion. Adjustments can be expected in Russia’s nuclear deterrence posture if Finland implements the announced legislative changes and is integrated more closely into the NATO nuclear deterrence framework.
Russian adjustments to nuclear deterrence posture in peacetime
Russia has already strengthened its nuclear-capable systems in the vicinity of Finland. In 2024, Russia announced the creation of an Iskander-M short-range ballistic missile brigade in the newly established Leningrad Military District. The Iskander-M has a range of 500 km, can reach most of Finnish territory, and can be equipped with conventional or non-strategic nuclear warheads. This was described by the Russian military authorities as an “adequate response” to Finnish NATO membership. Regardless of the announcement, the actual status of the Iskander-M systems associated with the brigade is unknown.
Related to this development, it is possible that Russia could store non-strategic nuclear weapons in the Republic of Karelia in connection with the Iskander-M missile brigade, in order to enhance readiness to arm the dual-capable systems with non-strategic nuclear warheads. According to the Jamestown Foundation, storage facilities for tactical nuclear warheads have been constructed on the territory of Belarus in connection with the deployment of Iskander-M missile systems. Similar developments have been described in some other bases as well.
In addition, it is possible that Russia could increase the tempo of its nuclear-capable Long-Range Aviation flights in the vicinity of Finland and the Nordic countries. This would most likely take place along the Finnish border and over the Baltic Sea and the Arctic Ocean. In both the Baltic Sea and the Arctic Ocean, these flights are a routine occurrence, but the increased tempo might be a way for Russia to strengthen its nuclear deterrence posture.
Russian measures in peacetime are also likely to be conducted in the political and information spheres. It is plausible that Russia would communicate its protests to the Finnish leadership and state that any deployment of nuclear weapons on Finnish territory would constitute a legitimate target for Russian nuclear strikes in wartime. This is likely to remain a persistent theme in Russian communications. In addition, Russia is likely to frame the steps taken by the Finnish government as aggressive or as increasing the potential for military conflict.
Russian adjustments to nuclear deterrence posture in a crisis
In a period of heightened tensions, Russia could raise the readiness of its nuclear forces. These measures could be taken if military conflict between Russia and NATO was expected, if the forward deployment of nuclear weapons was anticipated, or if nuclear weapons had already been deployed on Finnish territory.
First, Russia could enhance its nuclear deterrence posture by placing non-strategic nuclear weapons in readiness on aerial and naval platforms during a period of crisis or as a corresponding measure to the forward deployment of NATO non-strategic nuclear weapons. This could increase Russia’s readiness to conduct non-strategic nuclear strikes on critical military targets and potential locations hosting nuclear weapons at the outbreak of hostilities, if Russian territory became a target of a widespread attack.
This measure would also create strategic ambiguity. It is a policy of the Russian Armed Forces, inherited from the Cold War era, that many conventional long-range strike capabilities are dual-capable and can be equipped with either a conventional warhead or a non-strategic nuclear warhead. It would be difficult for NATO countries to assess which platforms were carrying conventional warheads and which were armed with nuclear weapons. This policy could be implemented, for example, in the Russian Northern Fleet, the Baltic Fleet and the Aerospace Forces.
Second, Russia could demonstrate its readiness and capability by organising missile exercises using land-, air- and sea-based capabilities, with weapon systems that could be equipped with non-strategic nuclear warheads. These exercises would likely be broadcasted and distributed in the information sphere to influence decision-making in NATO countries.
Third, readiness and snap exercises could be organised by the Russian strategic nuclear forces, including command-and-control exercises and the dispersal of capabilities. In the Russian nuclear triad, Long-Range Aviation is the most visible and flexible tool for strategic and deterrence signalling, so these capabilities would likely be used in the directions perceived as threatening.
Fourth, Russia would likely engage in nuclear threats in the political and information spheres in order to influence Western military-political decision-making. This would likely be intended to signal that any sites associated with forward-deployed nuclear weapons would be treated as priority targets in the opening phase of a conflict. The messaging would likely include statements that forward nuclear deployments could become targets of nuclear attack.
Concluding thoughts
The Finnish government’s planned legislative changes would not mean the permanent stationing of nuclear weapons in Finland. Instead, they would remove a legal restriction and create the possibility for nuclear deployment in specific circumstances linked to NATO nuclear deterrence policy, most likely during a crisis or an extended period of heightened tensions.
For Russia, the most likely response would be a combination of rhetoric and nuclear deterrence adjustment rather than a single dramatic change or escalation. In peacetime, this could mean further expansion of nuclear-capable systems near Finland alongside political and information pressure. In a crisis, however, the changes could become more serious: Russia could raise the readiness of its dual-capable air, sea and land-based systems by arming them with non-strategic nuclear warheads, stage nuclear signalling exercises, and intensify threats aimed at influencing decision-making in Finland and across NATO.
Even if nuclear weapons are never stationed or deployed to Finland, the policy and legislative changes would integrate Finland more directly into the dynamics of NATO-Russia nuclear deterrence, which Finland needs to be capable of managing. ֍
What would Von Moltke the Elder say about this? “A state bordering a great power must ensure that any aggression has an immediate and intolerable cost.”
Nothing, just vocal cursings. So go ahead and good for you. Let them fear. And tell them, you will send nuks back, if Russia sends back land it took in 1939-1940.