Belousov’s Blueprint for Fighting in Ukraine
The Russian Ministry of Defence prioritises drones, electronic warfare, air defence, tactical mobility, and shared situational awareness to gain combat advantage in Ukraine
By Juuso Eskonmaa
Mellenion
The Russian Minister of Defence, Andrey Belousov, argues that combat operations in Ukraine have undergone a significant shift.
He emphasises four trends: (1) drones and FPV drones as the primary tactical strike systems; (2) Ukraine’s “drone wall,” which is pushing Russian forces to rely more on mobility and electronic warfare (EW) during offensive actions; (3) greater emphasis on shared situational awareness at tactical and operational levels; and (4) an increase in the tempo and scale of Ukrainian deep strikes into Russia.
This analysis is based on the speech by Belousov from December 17, 2025, when Russia’s military and political leadership convened in Moscow for the Expanded Meeting of the Ministry of Defence (MoD) Collegium. In this speech, Belousov outlined the primary trends in the war and priorities for 2026. The speech appears to have received limited attention in Western coverage and analytical communities.
Increasing reliance on drones in combat
A key takeaway from the speech concerns the large-scale use of drones and their decisive role in combat.
The official position in the leadership of the Russian MoD increasingly reflects the central role of drones in modern warfare. Belousov argues that drones have assumed the role of the primary strike element in the war in Ukraine, rather than a supporting element. Their use in reconnaissance and strike missions is described as having grown significantly. He also stresses the role of drones in reconnaissance, counter-battery fire, and targeting deliveries of ammunition and supplies to the front.
Based on the elements highlighted by the leadership of the Russian MoD, a central challenge is creating drones capable of reconnaissance and strike actions in a tightly contested environment in which EW, counter-drone, and air defence capabilities are present at scale.
Belousov presents this shift as being institutionalised, framing the creation of the Unmanned Systems Troops as a core development in this sphere. A goal for 2026 at the Russian MoD and Armed Forces is the integration of Unmanned Systems Troops into the organisational structures of the wider Armed Forces.
The creation of the Unmanned Systems Troops at the end of 2025 indicates that the current reliance on drones is not a temporary battlefield adaptation driven by operational pressures, but an integral part of longer-term efforts to develop Russian force structure and capabilities.
Russian offensives rely on mobility and electronic warfare
Russian MoD leadership describes Ukrainian forces as aiming to slow Russian advances and inflict casualties on assaulting units by establishing what is described as a “line of drones”: a zone approximately 10–15 kilometres deep.
Because Belousov makes this a core element of his description of the war, I read the emergence of a Ukrainian drone-dominated ‘kill zone’ as contributing to a shift in Russian military thinking. A deep, adaptive drone wall reduces opportunities for rapid manoeuvre and the exploitation of breakthroughs. The zone of constant surveillance and routine reconnaissance-strike drone activity complicates attempts at combined arms manoeuvre and limits the Russian use of armoured platforms, including tanks and IFVs.
As described by Belousov, the primary Russian response has been an emphasis on mobility and EW protection for front-line units. One attempted solution has been to increase mobility through the widespread distribution of motorcycles and other light vehicles. Protection of assault troops has increasingly centred on EW. The mass deployment of localised EW systems indicates that electronic protection against drones is increasingly treated as a baseline requirement for survival, rather than a specialised capability.
Systems such as Obereg («Оберег»), Peroed («Пероед»), Silok («Силок») and Sosedka («Соседка») are designed to jam or suppress drones’ communications and control links at the tactical level. The official numbers provided by Belousov claim that more than 130,000 counter-drone EW systems were delivered to the forward areas in 2025. Further increases in EW density are identified as a priority task for 2026.
Integration of command and control
Another change in Russian combat operations is described as an increased emphasis on informational awareness at the tactical and operational levels. This is related to the framing of command and control integration as a core combat capability.
The stated objective is the creation of a unified and secure command-and-control environment covering force structures from the platoon to the brigade and division (соединение) level, enabling troops to access various digital services. The services mentioned include a shared tactical and aerial situation, satellite imagery, meteorological data, and geospatial information.
The system behind this integration is titled Svod («Свод»), a networked command-and-control system designed to enable shared situational awareness across formations. According to Belousov, the system has completed testing within the Grouping of Forces “Centre” (группировка войск «Центр»). The stated objective is to deploy it across all groupings of forces engaged in the war by September 2026.
Despite Belousov’s ambitious goals, the aspirations related to command and control integration are unlikely to be achieved in the short term. Such reforms are difficult to implement even under peacetime conditions, and far more challenging during continuous attritional warfare across a frontline extending for over a thousand kilometres.
The changes to command and control systems are therefore likely to be incremental. Even so, these efforts point to an identified deficiency within the Russian military system, as well as an articulated vision for addressing it.
Ukraine has achieved success in deep strikes into Russia
Belousov considers the expansion of Ukrainian strikes deep into Russia, in both intensity and scale, to be the fourth primary development of the war. According to the numbers provided, from the beginning of 2025 Ukrainians managed to conduct 1,500 long-range UAV strikes per month, increasing to 3,700 per month from May 2025 onwards.
Based on the speech, I would argue that protection from drones through increasing the density of EW and air defence systems in Russian formations is likely to be a key priority for Russian procurement in 2026. Belousov sets a goal of strengthening the forward zone and rear areas with air and missile defence capabilities to intercept long-range drones and cruise missiles.
The priority air defence systems are Pantsir («Панцирь») combat vehicles and other short- and medium-range SAM (surface-to-air missile) systems. Mobile fire teams are highlighted and their primary counter-UAV weapon systems are described as MANPADS Verba («Верба») and air-defence complexes Zubr and Citadel («Зубр» and «Цитадель»). In addition, the Russians are deploying interceptor FPV drones, aiming to increase their use in the first half of 2026.
Conclusions
As the war enters its fifth year on February 24, the speech of the Russian Minister of Defence is significant in its contents. Drones have become the primary strike component, and the struggle for drone supremacy is a vital element in how the leadership of the Russian MoD views the ongoing war. This battle is waged through the constant development of new types of drones, counter-drone technologies, electronic warfare capabilities, and increasingly dense air defence networks. These capabilities are increasingly presented as prerequisites for survival on the battlefield.
Compared with the sustained attention given to unmanned systems, electronic warfare, air defence, and secure networked command-and-control, the speech gives relatively less emphasis to armoured manoeuvre and mechanised warfare as priorities in adaptation or procurement.
The speech by the Russian Minister of Defence serves a specific institutional function. It is intended to define priorities, issue guidance, and articulate the official position of the Russian military-political leadership, as well as to foreign audiences. The content can therefore be interpreted as institutional signalling, highlighting the doctrinal and procurement priorities of the Russian MoD.
The change in the nature of Russian thinking about the war is likely persistent rather than temporary. The lessons from the war in Ukraine are being institutionalised in new force structures, such as the Unmanned Systems Troops, and disseminated inside the Russian Armed Forces. The learning is likely to continue after the end of the war in Ukraine. The lessons from the war can be expected to have an impact on the State Armament Programme and the development of force structures inside the Russian Armed Forces. ֍
The full transcript and video of the speech is available in Russian, published by the Kremlin: http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/78801.
The figures cited are reported as Russian MoD claims and should be treated as unverified.