By Juuso Eskonmaa
Mellenion

Introduction

“The use of unmanned aerial vehicles is one of the modern methods of conducting armed struggle, which adjusts all others, regardless of the service branch and branch of arms of the Armed Forces in whose interests they are used.”

– V.V. Putin

The Russian Navy’s performance in the Black Sea since February 2022 has been far worse than expected. The loss of the cruiser Moskva, a sustained Ukrainian drone and missile campaign against the Black Sea Fleet’s infrastructure and surface fleet, and the eventual withdrawal of naval assets from Sevastopol add up to a strategic failure. A fleet built for naval dominance could not operate freely even in its home waters.

These failures are now being closely analysed in Russia. Inside the Russian armed forces’ research establishments, they are generating a body of theoretical writing on what the experience reveals about the future of naval combat, and how the fleet must adapt.

One of the most authoritative recent contributions has come from Admiral Nikolai Evmenov, in an article titled ‘The Use of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles in Modern Naval Combat’ (Применение беспилотных летательных аппаратов в современном морском бою), published in the Russian Ministry of Defence’s official naval journal, Morskoi Sbornik (Морской Сборник). His central claim is far-reaching: UAVs have not merely refined naval combat but transformed its content, and a fleet that means to compete must build its future combat model around unmanned systems.

Why Evmenov’s voice has authority

Evmenov served as Commander-in-Chief of the Russian Navy from 3 May 2019 to 10 March 2024, through the opening years of the full-scale invasion of Ukraine. He now heads the Admiral Kuznetsov Naval Academy (Военно-морская академия имени Адмирала Флота Советского Союза Н.Г. Кузнецова) in St Petersburg, Russia’s premier naval higher-education institution and a combined military training and research centre. The post gives him authority over both the education of naval officers and the direction of naval research – the two channels through which ideas become force structure, procurement, and doctrine.

He is also one of the most prolific writers on naval theory in contemporary Russia, a regular contributor to Voennaia mysl’ (Военная Мысль) and Morskoi Sbornik. Both are official Ministry of Defence publications, so appearances in them signal institutional legitimacy and acceptance for his views. Operational experience commanding the Navy at war, authority over naval education and research, and an established record of theoretical publication together give Evmenov an authoritative standing in the Russian naval community.

The changing substance of naval combat

Evmenov’s primary argument concerns the nature of naval warfare itself. He opens his article with the words of Vladimir Putin quoted above, and the choice is deliberate: Russia’s political and naval leadership appear to be converging on a single view, that unmanned systems are central to the future of war.

«совершенствование морского боя в современных условиях ведения боевых действий на море с использованием БПЛА будет заключаться не в изменении установленной организации действий сил (войск) в пространстве и во времени, а в изменении содержания морского боя»

The improvement of naval combat in modern conditions will consist not in changing the established organisation of forces in space and in time, but in changing the content (содержание) of naval combat.

The word содержание is doing the work here. It denotes the substance or content of naval warfare, not its outward arrangement: the change Evmenov describes is not an adjustment to how naval forces fight, but a change in what naval combat is.

He sets this against a recent past. Ten to twelve years ago, UAVs were confined to supporting roles – aerial reconnaissance, target designation, and battle damage assessment. They extended the capabilities of traditional naval forces but did not replace them.

That relationship has now reversed. UAVs have become a primary capability for completing combat tasks, including the destruction of enemy targets through direct fires and electronic suppression. Evmenov’s projection goes further still: tactical actions in naval combat will eventually be conducted exclusively by robotic and unmanned systems.

On this view, a fleet without sufficient UAVs does not merely lack specific capabilities; it faces significant disadvantages against an opponent whose formations and tactical units are measurably more effective in combat, and able to engage its opponents at longer ranges.

Global trends and the lessons of Ukraine

Two things shape Russian naval thought here: international developments, watched closely in Russia, and the experience of the war in Ukraine. Evmenov identifies six principal trends in UAV development among the leading countries:

- falling production costs, which improve overall cost-effectiveness;

- AI-enabled swarm control;

- closer integration of UAVs with manned aviation;

- an expanding range of tasks, up to the full replacement of manned systems;

- the development of air-, sea-, and ground-based launch platforms;

- and the emergence of hybrid UAVs able to operate across domains, such as air-land and air-sea.

From Ukraine he draws two principal empirical lessons. The first concerns situational awareness. Among the most consequential factors in combat is the commander’s knowledge of the situation, and in a fast-changing environment that knowledge must be supplied continuously and in real time; reconnaissance UAVs are among the primary means of providing it.

The second concerns targeting precision. The accuracy with which a target is located directly determines the effectiveness of a strike, and such precision is now within reach through reconnaissance drones combined with automated AI-assisted data processing and machine vision systems that identify priority targets and can correct fire against them in real time.

His most striking claim concerns the attacks on the Black Sea Fleet itself. The massed Ukrainian strikes, combining UAVs and unmanned surface vehicles against Black Sea Fleet basing points, were conducted, he states, with reconnaissance support from the US Navy’s strategic UAV, the RQ-4C Triton, operating within the American Broad Area Maritime Surveillance system (BAMS).

The acknowledgement is notable on two counts. First, a Russian admiral is stating, in an official MoD publication, that American strategic ISR contributed to the strikes that damaged and displaced his fleet. Second, he treats the Triton/BAMS architecture not as an accusation against the United States but as a model of the kind of persistent maritime surveillance the Russian Navy must build for itself.

A future force in three tiers

Evmenov argues that the Russian Navy needs a three-tier UAV architecture. At the top sit airfield-based strategic and operational-tactical reconnaissance-strike drones, flown by naval aviation as the fleet’s long-range, persistent surveillance and strike arm.

In the middle is a category that has drawn little notice in Western analysis: operational-tactical, ship-based vertical take-off and landing (VTOL) UAVs, again within naval aviation, able to redeploy onto ships equipped with helicopter decks. This intermediate tier bridges the fixed airfield component and the shipborne one, giving surface combatants longer-range aerial reach without dedicated carrier infrastructure.

At the tactical, unit level, ships carry fixed-wing and rotary-wing tactical UAVs, loitering munitions, and FPV drones. Evmenov even envisages light tactical UAVs for submarines, launched from containers deployed through the torpedo tube.

Crucially, he states that the Russian Navy is already executing a plan (осуществляется план) to equip surface ships and coastal defence units with UAVs of various classes, and that UAV units of different types and designations are already being formed within naval aviation. The inclusion of coastal defence troops matters: the effort reaches beyond the fleet’s ships to the Navy’s land-based coastal defence arm.

Evmenov’s near-term priority is to raise the strike and reconnaissance capabilities of existing UAV systems, and to integrate artificial intelligence into naval command systems. The immediate programme for the surface fleet is an operational-tactical UAV system built around a ship-based VTOL UAV. The medium-term objective is more ambitious: a fixed-wing reconnaissance-strike UAV at the strategic and operational-tactical level, intended as a key future strike capability. Further ahead, he identifies anti-submarine warfare, transport, and special tasks as the next areas of expansion.

A vision for the future - not yet capability

This is not a speculative essay. It is a doctrinal argument, made by the head of Russia’s leading naval academic institution in the Ministry of Defence’s official journal, and drawing on the operational experience of the Navy that Evmenov himself commanded through the opening years of a war that taught it the painful lessons of modern naval warfare. The claim that UAVs are transforming the substance of naval combat may signal a coming reform of the Russian Navy.

The medium- and longer-term ambitions show its scope. UAVs are to expand across a widening range of Navy missions, above all in reconnaissance and strike: persistent surveillance of maritime and coastal areas, and an increase in the number of available sensors. They are also to expand the quantity and the types of strike assets the fleet can field, with coastal troops and naval aviation taking a larger part in naval combat as long-range strike assets grow within their organizations.

The planned move into anti-submarine warfare would extend unmanned aviation into the undersea domain. Taken together, these point to a Navy that is not bolting UAVs onto an existing force structure but rethinking how the fundamental tasks of naval forces are to be done, with traditional capabilities taking a secondary role in many respects.

It should be noted that Evmenov does not assess whether the Russian Navy can translate this doctrine into operational capability under sanctions, and amid the industrial demands of an attritional war. That is the question that matters, and the one we will keep watching. ֍

Previous Article

By Andreas Turunen
Mellenion

Introduction

The use of the air-to-air R-37M missile is a known phenomenon in the war in Ukraine, and it has been observed by several analysts who follow the air war closely. In recent comments to Business Insider, the RUSI analyst Justin Bronk noted that the R-37M has become a standard armament on the Su-35S.

Russian military authors have actively been discussing the capabilities of the R-37M, offering a useful window into how Russia sees the development of the air war in Ukraine. Colonel A. Yu. Stepkin, in his Voyennaya Mysl article ‘Tactics of Employment of Aviation Guided Missiles “Air-to-Air” of Long Range in the Course of the SMO’ [1], provides an interesting analytical account of why and how the Russian Aerospace Forces have employed the long-range air-to-air missile R-37M, NATO name AA-13 AXEHEAD, against Ukrainian air targets.

Stepkin not only explains the benefits the missile has provided for the conduct of aerial combat operations in Ukraine. He also appears to offer a candid account of the shortcomings of the Russian Aerospace Forces against the Ukrainian Armed Forces. Voyennaya Mysl is Russia’s most prestigious military journal and, as such, the views and arguments presented there reflect topics considered important to the development of the Russian Armed Forces.

The Application of the R-37M Missile

For the Russian Aerospace Forces, the primary motivation for employing long-range air-to-air missiles stems from the need to overcome Ukrainian advances in aerial warfare. According to Stepkin, the task of destroying Ukrainian air-based systems is shared by two types of units: Quick Reaction Alert (QRA) aircraft stationed at air bases and fighters conducting Combat Air Patrol (CAP). These fighters aim to launch their missiles from inside the borders of the Russian Federation, including occupied Ukrainian territories.

The principal advantage of long-range missile use, in Stepkin’s account, lies in the sudden and unexpected nature of the launches. In his article, Stepkin repeatedly emphasises the difficulty Russian fighter aviation faces in using concealment, owing to the perceived superior Western information and intelligence capabilities provided to Ukraine. Realising the advantage of sudden and unexpected missile launches in practice, however, has required a substantive evolution of tactics over the course of the war.

That evolution began with a pairing that did not last. Stepkin explains that in the opening phase of the conflict, the Russian Air Force relied on the MiG-31BM armed with the R-33 missile to deliver long-range air-to-air fires.

Improved Ukrainian tactics made the pairing obsolete, compelling Russian fighter aviation to adopt the newer R-37M missile carried by the Su-35S airframe. The newer combination is intended to operate within a layered kill chain.

The kill chain of the Russian Aerospace Forces is built around a two-layer approach. Fighters seek to launch their long-range air-to-air missiles before Ukrainian air targets enter the engagement zone of ground-based air-defence troops.

Translating that scheme into consistent operational results has been hampered by shortcomings on the Russian side. Stepkin attributes part of Ukraine’s tactical success to the overtly rigid manner in which Russia has employed its fighter aircraft. Examples include the routine and continuous use of the same airfields, flight routes and three-dimensional flight profiles, which are easy for Ukrainian mission planners to predict.

A second Russian constraint sits at the level of command and control. It is possible to read between the lines of the article that the current C2 system provided by the radiotechnical troops does not maximise the use of the R-37M, owing to the requirement to obtain authorisation for each missile launch. These self-imposed frictions, combined with a demanding external operating environment, are limiting the effectiveness of Russian air combat.

The principal tasks set for the Aerospace Forces’ fighter aviation in the war are the destruction of air targets and the provision of air cover for ground troops against air-launched munitions.

The completion of these tasks by the Russian Aerospace Forces is limited by four factors: large-scale Western military assistance to Ukraine; the effectiveness of Ukrainian ground-to-air defence systems of both Soviet and foreign origin; the reconnaissance capabilities Western countries provide to Ukraine; and the limitations of the Aerospace Forces’ own reconnaissance-information support. Of these four, the reconnaissance imbalance between Russia and Ukraine receives particular weight.

Stepkin notes that one of the most significant factors in air combat in Ukraine has been the intelligence support provided by Western countries to Ukraine. He suggests that Western intelligence and reconnaissance assets can reveal air-to-air missile launches by Russian fighters against Ukrainian air assets, and that the West is capable of supporting Ukrainian command and control by conveying significant information about the actions of Russian Aerospace Forces units.

Ukrainian air-defence tactics have shifted from stationary, location-bound air defence to ambush-type employment that exploits concealment and mobility. This has created problems for the Russian fighter employment.

The inferiority of Russia’s reconnaissance systems relative to Ukraine’s, Stepkin contends, does not allow the Russian Armed Forces to locate Ukrainian air-defence systems. This, in turn, reduces the employability of Russian Air Force’s fighter assets close to the front line. He adds that Ukraine’s current pattern of air-defence employment complicates the use of fighters, owing to the difficulty of estimating the ranges and capabilities of Ukrainian air-defence systems.

Ukrainian fighter aviation, meanwhile, has adapted directly against the long-range missile itself. The specific shortcoming Stepkin highlights is Ukraine’s ability to shift the counter-air engagement from forward to rear-hemisphere interception, which halves the effective range of the R-37M and lowers the probability of a kill.

Analytical Thoughts

For Western audiences, Stepkin’s account indicates that Ukraine has been successful in posing challenges to the Russian Aerospace Forces. Ukraine has been able to increase the capability of its Air Force and implement Western technology, techniques, tactics and procedures.

From a Russian perspective, Stepkin offers novel material on R-37M employment and tactical considerations. His account suggests that the Aerospace Forces have a willingness to evolve not only their technical applications, but also the wider tactics and procedures of air combat.

The primary argument that emerges from his account is that Russia conducts innovation reactively and under structural disadvantage. He depicts the Russian Aerospace Forces being consistently a step behind Ukraine that enjoys technological and informational superiority provided by its Western partners. The framing is broadly dialectical: the Russian side is constantly reacting to Ukrainian adaptations, which it follows and analyses closely.

Finally, Stepkin is unusually candid about the internal factors that constrain Russian combat capability. He sets out a list of shortcomings, together with the changes required in both operational conduct and technical application to overcome them. On his account, there is a doctrinal gap that prevents the R-37M’s full technical potential from being realised. ֍

Notes:

[1] Co-authors of this article include Colonel A. A. Gvozdenko and Yu. G. Kravchov.

Previous Article

By Juuso Eskonmaa
Mellenion

Russia’s shipping in the Baltic Sea has been severely disrupted. In recent weeks, dozens of Russia-linked tankers were stranded in the narrow Gulf of Finland as a result of repeated Ukrainian strikes on the Russian oil terminals at Ust-Luga and Primorsk. The terminals are critical for Russia’s oil exports. Together they handle nearly half of Russia’s oil exports, including both crude and refined products.

Estonian Navy Commander Ivo Värk recently stated that Estonia will not apprehend vessels remaining in its Exclusive Economic Zone, because “the risk of military escalation is just too high.”

Members of the G7 and the European Union have imposed a wide array of sanctions on Russian energy exports as a result of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. European coastal states have boarded, detained, or seized Russian-linked vessels on varying legal grounds: suspected sailing under a false flag; inadequate seaworthiness in an ageing shadow fleet; missing or inadequate insurance and flag documentation; environmental protection concerns; and criminal investigations into sabotage or espionage, which have repeatedly led to the discovery of sanctions violations once inspectors are aboard.

Estonia’s restraint reflects rising tensions across the Baltic. Russia has responded to the sanctions enforcement pressure with increasingly overt military signalling. In May 2025, after the Estonian Navy attempted to intercept a sanctioned unflagged vessel that refused to stop and began trailing it, Russia deployed a Su-35 fighter jet to prevent the seizure, violating Estonian airspace in the process.

Over the past year Russia has built a comprehensive military posture to protect its shipping in the region and across its narrow maritime approaches. This posture combines naval escorts, the deployment of fighter aircraft, armed personnel aboard Russia-linked vessels, and a continuous information campaign in support of the measures. Ongoing legal changes are also creating additional pretexts for the use of military force. The hardening posture has raised the risks of intercepting Russia-linked ships.

Emerging Militarisation of Russian Merchant Shipping

Presidential aide and head of the Russian Maritime Collegium Nikolai Patrushev has been the most active Russian official speaking publicly on the protection of shipping, with regular statements from spring 2025 onwards. He has described the need to maintain naval presence on primary maritime trade routes, including in distant maritime zones, on a continuous basis.

Russia argues that any blockade attempt would be illegal under international law and dismisses the “shadow fleet” label as a “legal fiction”. On this basis, Patrushev has threatened that “a blockade would be broken and liquidated by the Russian Navy.”

On 26 May 2025 it was announced that the Russian Maritime Collegium had prepared measures to prevent restrictions on shipping in the Baltic, but the measures were not made public at the time. Almost a year later, on 25 March 2026, Patrushev publicly announced a list of measures to improve the protection of Russian shipping in key maritime routes:

• A standing procedure for “operational interaction” between shipping companies, port operators, and the Russian Navy, covering primarily the Baltic Sea and the Black Sea. This format establishes a direct connection between the commercial operators, Russian port administration, and the Russian Navy.

• The Navy is tasked with protecting designated vessels and assets and with maintaining continuous presence across defined maritime areas, while standing ready to respond to incidents. This protection applies to vessels carrying Russian cargo regardless of whether they sail under the Russian flag.

• A process for shipowners to request, through port captains, the placement of mobile fire teams aboard Russian flagged ships. Mobile fire teams (мобильные огневые группы) typically refer to air defence units with light weaponry. They would be intended to act as a deterrent against boardings by helicopters as well as an anti-drone capability.

Taken together, these measures indicate formal, standing procedures for the protection of shipping with military force. Earlier escort and protection activity was likely improvised; the new processes are embedded in the shipping bureaucracy, with port administrations acting as an important point of contact. The most consequential development is the possibility of placing anti-aircraft-capable teams on vessels sailing under the Russian flag. If implemented, this would shift the deterrence calculus for boarding Russian flagged commercial ships.

The Limits of Russian Naval Escorts

Russia’s capacity to escort merchant ships with Navy vessels is limited and geographically constrained. Retired Vice-Admiral Ulyan Bayzert, former deputy commander of the Russian Northern Fleet, argues in Kommersant that occasional escorts of Russian merchant vessels do not solve the problem. He claims that the Russian Navy is physically incapable of providing regular convoy protection. In the Baltic Sea, regular escorts would be possible only as far as the Danish Straits, after which vessels would be left without protection. A corvette can operate autonomously for only a month, and a small missile ship for only ten days. Russian escorts therefore cannot reliably or regularly operate in the Atlantic to protect shipping.

The less costly alternative has been to place armed personnel aboard Russian merchant ships. The Organised Crime and Corruption Reporting Project recently published information about Russian protection teams operating on tankers carrying Russian energy products. By examining crew manifests, the investigation found that such tankers often carry two additional Russian men aboard, many of whom have connections to Russian security services or private military companies. Armed uniformed personnel aboard Russia-linked vessels were first publicly confirmed by the Swedish Navy in December 2025.

A New Legal Pretext for the Protection of Shipping

Russia is adapting its legislation to permit the use of military force abroad to prevent the arrest, detention, and prosecution of Russian citizens. On 14 April, the Russian Duma passed at first reading a legislative amendment that authorises the Russian Armed Forces to operate abroad and use military force, on the decision of the President, to protect Russian citizens abroad. Although comparable provisions already exist in Russian legislation, the new amendment focuses on cases of arrest, detention, and criminal or other proceedings by foreign states.

The provided legal documentation gives no specific reasons for the changes, nor any examples of cases to which the legislation would apply. Russian legal expert Ilya Rachkov, interviewed by Kommersant, assessed that the legislation would apply to the protection of Russian commercial vessels and other transport assets placed on sanctions lists. He envisions a case in which foreign border guards board a vessel carrying Russian cargo and arrest its crew. In such a case, Rachkov said, the Russian Armed Forces could be deployed, provided that “they receive the relevant order from the President”.

On 22 April, the Russian Ministry of Transport announced that up to 1,000 vessels could be transferred to the Russian flag. The Ministry claims that the total tonnage sailing under the Russian flag has more than doubled to nearly 20 million tons over the past two years and may reach 30 million tons by the end of 2026. The vessels to be transferred are mainly large tankers, and the Ministry presents reflagging as a “safer” option, since the state gains a broader range of options to protect shipping under its jurisdiction. The Ministry framed the transfer as a response to the targeting of vessels that carry Russian cargo but do not fly the Russian flag.

The reflagging initiative and the new legal pretexts for the use of military force are likely connected elements of the militarisation of the Russian merchant fleet. The legislation provides legal grounds for the use of military force abroad to protect Russian citizens, including in cases of arrest made by foreign authorities boarding vessels that carry Russian cargo.

The flag transfer expands the number of vessels to be partly crewed by Russian citizens and operating under Russian jurisdiction, effectively broadening the category of cases in which the Russian authorities could use military force to protect shipping. Together, the legal changes and the flag transfer are likely intended to act as a deterrence mechanism against the seizure of ships, substituting for the Russian Navy’s insufficient capacity to escort vessels evading sanctions.

Concluding Thoughts

The Russian authorities appear to have concluded that the covert sanctions evasion regime no longer provides sufficient cover for Russian energy exports. There is an ongoing shift towards a more overt and militarised posture to protect ships evading EU and G7 sanctions. This presents a direct challenge to the enforcement of sanctions. Russia has engineered an escalation trap: the boarding of Russian ships may increasingly be met with armed resistance and a Russian naval response.

Over the coming six months, further transfers of tankers to the Russian flag and continued militarisation of the merchant fleet are likely. Armed personnel and mobile fire teams aboard Russian ships should be expected with growing frequency. Despite its limitations, Russia is likely to increase the number of naval escorts in the Baltic Sea, the North Sea, and the English Channel. The legislation on the protection of Russian citizens abroad has not yet completed its parliamentary passage; if it does pass, it will provide a wider legal pretext for the use of force and a basis for more threatening rhetoric from the Russian side.

The announced Russian measures should be read as stated intentions, but their implementation faces constraints. The expansion of Russian naval escorts and the maintenance of continuous readiness on the high seas demand substantial resources from the Russian Navy and its crews, which will likely be a central limiting factor.

Mobile fire teams aboard ships may offer protection against helicopter boardings and drones, but Russia’s air defences are already increasingly stretched, and arming the merchant fleet would compete with air defence requirements on Russian territory. In addition, even if the number of ships sailing under the Russian flag increases significantly, the number of Russian citizens among crew members is unlikely to rise given the limited supply of Russian seafarers.

We are likely to see a more militarised Russian merchant fleet with uneven implementation reflecting the resource constraints. Escalation risks in sanctions enforcement will rise as Russia's rhetoric hardens and military measures are implemented to defend its shipping. ֍

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By Andreas Turunen
Mellenion

If only tactical and operational factors are considered, simulation or scenario-based research into a war between NATO and Russia is relatively straightforward. In purely military terms, Russia does not possess the means to sustain such a conflict without risking defeat in a confrontation with a technologically and numerically superior NATO alliance.

Wars, however, are primarily fought at the strategic and political levels. They cannot be reduced to a contest of one weapon against another, because weapons are not used in a political vacuum, separate from the existing reality of relations between states.

Accordingly, the weapons used in armed conflict are always subordinate to political, legal, relational and escalation management concerns. Not very long ago, Ukraine faced constant restraint and limitations imposed by its partners. Those limitations concerned both certain types of weapons and whether they could be used against targets inside the borders of Russia.

In a hypothetical conflict between NATO and Russia, there is a considerable chance that participating Western countries would impose different restrictions and so-called sanctuary policies, limiting the use of certain weapon systems and strikes against certain targets inside Russia. These policies are important to address because their nature and effects can be assessed well before armed conflict begins.

The primary question, then, is this: how can NATO states impose the fewest possible restrictions on their military decision-makers so as to ensure the maximum operational and tactical effectiveness of their national militaries while limiting the risk of uncontrolled escalation?

Limitations on the Use of Military Capabilities

The role of escalation management in a conflict is to avoid a situation in which the war spins out of control on either side. This means that both sides impose limitations on themselves in how they fight and conduct combat operations.

In a war between NATO and Russia, the greatest limitations on NATO’s operational conduct would stem from internal structural issues, all linked to escalation management. Three are especially salient.

The first is depth limitations. In selecting targets inside Russia, political pressure could limit strikes to a certain depth. Airfields, logistic hubs, repair facilities and command centres beyond a certain distance from NATO borders might therefore be excluded.

The second is politically sensitive targets. Certain targets, such as components of the Russian nuclear triad, could be considered politically too sensitive and efforts to degrade them too escalatory. This could lead to certain elements of the Russian Long-Range Aviation, as well as specific basing areas of the Northern Fleet, being excluded from target lists.

The third is limitations on the use of weapons systems. There is a credible risk that supplying states would not permit certain weapon systems to be used to their full capacity because of escalation concerns.

These hypothetical examples show how strategic and political considerations can constrain operational and tactical dynamics, making the conduct of operations, planning and combat actions less effective.

The Rationale Behind Self-Imposed Restrictions

What might tempt Western political and strategic decision-makers to impose restrictions on their own military capabilities? The answer lies in Russia’s nuclear capabilities.

The rationale for imposing restrictions on certain combat capabilities stems from Russia’s ability to maintain credible nuclear deterrence against Western countries. During peacetime, Russia maintains a strategic deterrence system that it constantly updates and adjusts on the basis of its perceptions and internal calculations about how the global military-political situation is evolving. It also continuously evaluates Western military potential relative to its Armed Forces in a possible conflict situation.

In a war between NATO and Russia, one of the most important goals for Western decision-makers would be to keep the conflict managed and below the threshold for the use of nuclear weapons. The necessity of escalation management means that combat would have to be constrained geographically, economically and politically.

This would introduce several dilemmas for NATO because regional perspectives differ. Countries in Eastern Europe, such as Poland or the Baltic states, would view attempts at conflict resolution as possible appeasement of Russia, allowing Russia to advance its interests through the threat of nuclear use. If NATO members were to make compromises in response to nuclear threats, the alliance would be placed in an increasingly weak position, with Russia able to increase its demands each time those demands were met.

At the same time, it would be necessary for NATO as a whole to keep the conflict at a managed level and to prevent uncontrolled escalation into a large-scale nuclear war. That makes some form of arbitration and communication necessary, creating possible avenues for compromise and settlement.

Concluding Thoughts

Across different scenarios involving a hypothetical war between NATO and Russia, the primary problem is not Russia’s combat capability but the risk of imposing too far-reaching restrictions on the use of military force and thereby limiting warfighters’ ability to achieve combat success.

The key point is that even if NATO holds significant advantages in military capabilities, especially in the aerospace and maritime domains, the necessity of escalation management and self-imposed restrictions might prevent those capabilities from being used to their full extent. The correlation of forces could therefore be far more balanced between Russia and NATO than the mere number of available capabilities suggests.

What, then, could be a solution for maximising the effectiveness of NATO’s armed forces in a hypothetical conflict? A possible answer would be to increase tolerance for risk and challenge Russian nuclear threats, matching the level of Russian threats and refusing to give in to Russian demands. The calibration of NATO military operations to be effective while managing escalation, requires rigorous research on Russian policies related to strategic and nuclear deterrence. The balancing act requires deft strategic analysis and significant willpower from US and NATO decision-makers on military operations and nuclear deterrence policy. ֍

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Cold Response 26 and Russia’s response suggest a pattern of managed military competition in the High North rather than an escalation in the near future. The scale of the NATO exercise is significant, while Russia has limited capacity to respond in a comparable manner while the war in Ukraine continues. Russian military activities have been concentrated in the maritime domain.

NATO members have convened for their Arctic exercise, Cold Response 26, between March 9 and 20. One of the key objectives of the exercise is to train the transport of troops from Sweden to Finland in the context of NATO FLF (Forward Land Forces) in Finland. This is an integral part of NATO’s deterrence and defence in the High North. The exercise includes more than 30,000 personnel from 14 countries training on the territory of Finland and Norway.

Russian military activities during Cold Response 26 should be interpreted in the context of Russia’s strategic deterrence system, which is primarily intended to deter the use of military force against Russia. Its second purpose is to dissuade the military-political leadership of adversarial countries from taking steps considered detrimental to Russian interests. During Cold Response 26, Russia appears to have sought to demonstrate its ability to defend its interests in the Arctic. In official and media messaging, this is linked to claims that Russia’s position in the region is under pressure.

Russia’s Narrative on the Exercise

Russian narratives primarily concern the increasing militarisation of the Arctic and the efforts of the United States to secure a strategic advantage in the region. As usual, Russian officials and media present the exercise as preparation for a possible confrontation with Russia in the Arctic.

The principal point of contention in these statements reflects Russian threat perceptions concerning control of the Northern Sea Route. The United States disputes complete Russian control over the Northern Sea Route and regards the route as an international shipping route, whereas Russia considers it a national maritime corridor under Russian jurisdiction.

The Russian Foreign Ministry offered limited comment, stating that NATO has “been considering hypothetical scenarios for a conflict with [Russia] in the Arctic for a long time”. In doing so, the Russian MFA appeared to downplay the significance of the ongoing NATO exercise.

On Russia Today, the exercises are framed in connection with the United States’ intention to gain control over international logistical routes and chokepoints, emphasised particularly in relation to the Northern Sea Route.

The Russian state newspaper Gazeta.ru frames the exercises in the context of competition for the Arctic, claiming that the United States and European members of NATO are seeking to declare the Arctic a “common area”, thereby allowing freedom for international use, and are demanding the internationalisation of the Northern Sea Route, limiting Russia’s rights to control the maritime territories.

Russia’s Naval Response in the Barents and Norwegian Seas

Based on public information, Russian military activities and exercises during the Cold Response exercise have been limited and measured. Russia does not appear to be seeking an escalation of tensions. Instead, it is demonstrating a range of capabilities in the Barents Sea, and its resolve, in a calibrated manner. In the weeks before the exercise, Russia conducted several routine military activities.

On February 24–26, Russia announced a Notice to Airmen (NOTAM) linked to missile exercises in the Barents Sea, in international waters though partly inside the Norwegian Exclusive Economic Zone. Russia often issues such warnings without actual missile launches or live-firing exercises taking place, and in this case the missile launch was not confirmed.

On February 27, the Norwegian Air Force intercepted a routine patrol flight of Russian Tu-95 bombers and two Su-35 fighters over the Barents Sea in the Arctic Ocean. The Tu-95s are part of the Russian Long-Range Aviation, and these routine flights form part of the Russian strategic deterrence system, aimed at reminding NATO countries of Russia’s nuclear and force-projection capabilities.

Interestingly, the Su-35 fighters carried the colour scheme of the Russkie Vityazi, the Russian Air Force’s aerobatic demonstration team. These aircraft appear to have been repurposed for operational use.

On 10 March, at the beginning of the Cold Response 26 exercise, Russia announced another missile exercise and issued a NOTAM warning for the period from 11 to 13 March, indicating a missile launch in the Barents Sea near Norway.

This missile launch actually took place and was Russia’s most significant demonstration of capability during Cold Response 26. According to information published by the Russian Ministry of Defence, on 12 March the Yasen-class nuclear attack submarine “Kazan” of the Northern Fleet launched an Oniks anti-ship missile from a submerged position at a target 300 km away. During the exercise, this appeared to be the most concrete public demonstration of Russia’s maritime strike capability.

Other routine military activities included an Il-20M reconnaissance aircraft flying near and inside the announced Cold Response exercise area on several occasions on 10 and 11 March. In both cases, Norwegian fighter jets intercepted the Russian reconnaissance aircraft. On 11 March, the Il-20 flew for several hours over the Norwegian Sea inside the announced zone of the NATO exercise.

The Northern Fleet also conducted anti-submarine exercises in the Barents Sea. According to Interfax, Ka-27M helicopters practiced search and detection of submarines and simulated torpedo attacks against a notional enemy submarine, with one of the Northern Fleet’s nuclear submarines acting as the opposing force. Separately, another report stated that the frigate Admiral Golovko conducted anti-submarine drills using its sonar system and carried out a live torpedo launch against a submarine target.

Concluding thoughts

During the Cold Response exercise, Russia’s primary intention appears to have been to demonstrate a range of naval capabilities, including anti-ship missile launches, anti-submarine warfare capabilities and reconnaissance activity. Taken together, these measures were most likely intended to signal Russian readiness and resolve in Arctic conditions. In that sense, Moscow’s response was less about matching NATO exercise activity than about reminding observers that it retains credible military reach in the maritime domain of the High North.

At the same time, based on publicly available information, Russia appears to view the exercise as manageable rather than acutely threatening. Its activities and rhetoric can be characterised as limited and measured. The military actions were framed as routine exercises, and official communications did not strongly emphasise a direct connection to Cold Response or to an immediate NATO threat. Russia has chosen to signal presence and capability, but not to frame the Cold Response 26 exercise as an escalatory step.

The character of the response also suggests a degree of calibration. Russia’s response remained focused on a relatively narrow set of naval and air capabilities. If Moscow had regarded Cold Response as more threatening, it would likely have demonstrated a broader range of capabilities and adopted a more confrontational signaling posture. Instead, the response appears to have been designed to communicate readiness and resolve in a limited way.

This pattern also reflects the nature of the exercise itself. Cold Response is primarily land-oriented, whereas Russia currently has limited capacity to stage large-scale ground exercises on a comparable scale because of the manpower and material demands of the war in Ukraine. This might be why Russia has chosen to downplay the significance of the exercise. As long as the war in Ukraine continues, Russia’s capacity to organize large-scale exercises in the High North will likely remain limited.

By Juuso Eskonmaa
Mellenion

The Finnish government announced its intention to remove legal restrictions on the deployment of nuclear weapons on Finnish territory. This deployment could be implemented in specific defence-related scenarios. Although the timetable for the legislative changes is currently unknown, they would mark a significant shift in Finnish foreign and security policy. The changes are presented as necessary for Finland’s integration into NATO, enabling the country to participate fully in NATO nuclear deterrence policy.

This article explains the context and outlines the scenarios in which nuclear deployment on Finnish territory would be possible. It also examines the potential Russian responses to the upcoming legislative changes and deployment of nuclear weapons in Finland during a crisis.

Regardless of its heated rhetoric and protests, Russia’s influence on Finnish decision-making is limited. Russia could, however, make adjustments to its nuclear deterrence posture in peacetime and during a crisis in response to Finnish decisions related to nuclear weapons.

Finland and NATO’s nuclear deterrence

Finnish Defence Minister Antti Häkkänen has announced that Finland will make legislative changes to allow the deployment of nuclear weapons on Finnish territory. He noted that the existing restrictions are not aligned with Finland’s requirements as a NATO member. Under the proposed framework, the transport of nuclear weapons into Finland would be permitted in situations related to military defence.

President Alexander Stubb has supported the legislative changes and described NATO deterrence as resting on three pillars: “conventional forces, missiles and nuclear weapons”. In his view, it is in Finland’s interest that there are no legislative restrictions on any of them.

Finland is not seeking to permanently host nuclear weapons on its territory, nor will NATO peacetime nuclear exercises involve deploying nuclear weapons in Finland. The possibility of deploying nuclear weapons on Finnish territory is related to NATO nuclear deterrence and the flexible adjustment of the deterrence posture according to the perceived level of threat.

The decision to deploy nuclear weapons on Finnish territory could be taken in a situation involving the threat of military conflict between Russia and NATO in the Nordic-Baltic region or Eastern Europe. The temporary deployment of nuclear weapons in Finland, or their transport through Finnish airspace, would strengthen NATO’s nuclear deterrence posture to prevent Russia from attacking a NATO member state.

NATO’s non-strategic nuclear weapons

As the ultimate guarantee of security, NATO nuclear deterrence policy relies on the strategic nuclear forces of the United States, as well as the independent strategic nuclear capabilities of France and the United Kingdom. However, the Finnish policy change is not related to strategic nuclear weapons. Instead, they are most likely related to the non-strategic nuclear weapons that the United States has forward deployed in Europe and which are part of NATO’s nuclear deterrence posture.

About 100 non-strategic nuclear gravity bombs B61 (versions −3 and −4) are thought to be deployed at six bases in five European countries: Aviano and Ghedi in Italy; Büchel in Germany; Incirlik in Turkey; Kleine Brogel in Belgium; and Volkel in the Netherlands. These countries have permanent storage of U.S. nuclear weapons and they participate in U.S. nuclear sharing.

These NATO non-strategic nuclear weapons can be launched from U.S. or certain allied aircraft. Several NATO member states have dual-capable aircraft that can deliver the nuclear weapons to their targets if necessary. As described by NATO, the aircraft are available for “nuclear roles at various levels of readiness”.

Therefore, the most likely way for the deployment of nuclear weapons in Finland would involve non-strategic nuclear weapons carried by U.S. or allied aircraft in the context of heightened tensions and the need for enhanced nuclear deterrence and strategic signalling.

Russia’s reactions to the Finnish policy change

Russia has already reacted to the possible Finnish legislative changes with sharp statements. The Russian statements are likely to have limited influence on the decisions currently being made in Finland. The Russian statements are most likely aimed at influencing the Finnish military-political leadership, the government, and public opinion. They are also likely intended to create a sense of danger and uncertainty around Finnish decision-making.

The press secretary of the Russian president, Dmitri Peskov, has stated that the “Finnish announcement leads to escalation of tensions in Europe; and if such plans are implemented, Russia will take corresponding measures”. He also stated that the deployment of nuclear weapons in Finland would be interpreted as a “direct threat” to Russia.

In the Russian Duma, deputy Andrei Kolesnik has framed the possibility of the deployment or transit of nuclear weapons in Finland, closer to Russia’s border, as “an act of aggression against Moscow”. In another interview, Kolesnik stated that “Finland is increasing the level of tensions from their side. I think that our armed forces will look more carefully towards Finland, because it is already directly on our borders” and that “the Russian military capabilities directed at Finland will increase. We cannot tolerate nuclear weapons on our borders”.

Kolesnik’s strongly worded statements seem to indicate a desire to expand military capabilities near Finland further. However, Russia is already struggling to implement the current plans for military expansion. Adjustments can be expected in Russia’s nuclear deterrence posture if Finland implements the announced legislative changes and is integrated more closely into the NATO nuclear deterrence framework.

Russian adjustments to nuclear deterrence posture in peacetime

Russia has already strengthened its nuclear-capable systems in the vicinity of Finland. In 2024, Russia announced the creation of an Iskander-M short-range ballistic missile brigade in the newly established Leningrad Military District. The Iskander-M has a range of 500 km, can reach most of Finnish territory, and can be equipped with conventional or non-strategic nuclear warheads. This was described by the Russian military authorities as an “adequate response” to Finnish NATO membership. Regardless of the announcement, the actual status of the Iskander-M systems associated with the brigade is unknown.

Related to this development, it is possible that Russia could store non-strategic nuclear weapons in the Republic of Karelia in connection with the Iskander-M missile brigade, in order to enhance readiness to arm the dual-capable systems with non-strategic nuclear warheads. According to the Jamestown Foundation, storage facilities for tactical nuclear warheads have been constructed on the territory of Belarus in connection with the deployment of Iskander-M missile systems. Similar developments have been described in some other bases as well.

In addition, it is possible that Russia could increase the tempo of its nuclear-capable Long-Range Aviation flights in the vicinity of Finland and the Nordic countries. This would most likely take place along the Finnish border and over the Baltic Sea and the Arctic Ocean. In both the Baltic Sea and the Arctic Ocean, these flights are a routine occurrence, but the increased tempo might be a way for Russia to strengthen its nuclear deterrence posture.

Russian measures in peacetime are also likely to be conducted in the political and information spheres. It is plausible that Russia would communicate its protests to the Finnish leadership and state that any deployment of nuclear weapons on Finnish territory would constitute a legitimate target for Russian nuclear strikes in wartime. This is likely to remain a persistent theme in Russian communications. In addition, Russia is likely to frame the steps taken by the Finnish government as aggressive or as increasing the potential for military conflict.

Russian adjustments to nuclear deterrence posture in a crisis

In a period of heightened tensions, Russia could raise the readiness of its nuclear forces. These measures could be taken if military conflict between Russia and NATO was expected, if the forward deployment of nuclear weapons was anticipated, or if nuclear weapons had already been deployed on Finnish territory.

First, Russia could enhance its nuclear deterrence posture by placing non-strategic nuclear weapons in readiness on aerial and naval platforms during a period of crisis or as a corresponding measure to the forward deployment of NATO non-strategic nuclear weapons. This could increase Russia’s readiness to conduct non-strategic nuclear strikes on critical military targets and potential locations hosting nuclear weapons at the outbreak of hostilities, if Russian territory became a target of a widespread attack.

This measure would also create strategic ambiguity. It is a policy of the Russian Armed Forces, inherited from the Cold War era, that many conventional long-range strike capabilities are dual-capable and can be equipped with either a conventional warhead or a non-strategic nuclear warhead. It would be difficult for NATO countries to assess which platforms were carrying conventional warheads and which were armed with nuclear weapons. This policy could be implemented, for example, in the Russian Northern Fleet, the Baltic Fleet and the Aerospace Forces.

Second, Russia could demonstrate its readiness and capability by organising missile exercises using land-, air- and sea-based capabilities, with weapon systems that could be equipped with non-strategic nuclear warheads. These exercises would likely be broadcasted and distributed in the information sphere to influence decision-making in NATO countries.

Third, readiness and snap exercises could be organised by the Russian strategic nuclear forces, including command-and-control exercises and the dispersal of capabilities. In the Russian nuclear triad, Long-Range Aviation is the most visible and flexible tool for strategic and deterrence signalling, so these capabilities would likely be used in the directions perceived as threatening.

Fourth, Russia would likely engage in nuclear threats in the political and information spheres in order to influence Western military-political decision-making. This would likely be intended to signal that any sites associated with forward-deployed nuclear weapons would be treated as priority targets in the opening phase of a conflict. The messaging would likely include statements that forward nuclear deployments could become targets of nuclear attack.

Concluding thoughts

The Finnish government’s planned legislative changes would not mean the permanent stationing of nuclear weapons in Finland. Instead, they would remove a legal restriction and create the possibility for nuclear deployment in specific circumstances linked to NATO nuclear deterrence policy, most likely during a crisis or an extended period of heightened tensions.

For Russia, the most likely response would be a combination of rhetoric and nuclear deterrence adjustment rather than a single dramatic change or escalation. In peacetime, this could mean further expansion of nuclear-capable systems near Finland alongside political and information pressure. In a crisis, however, the changes could become more serious: Russia could raise the readiness of its dual-capable air, sea and land-based systems by arming them with non-strategic nuclear warheads, stage nuclear signalling exercises, and intensify threats aimed at influencing decision-making in Finland and across NATO.

Even if nuclear weapons are never stationed or deployed to Finland, the policy and legislative changes would integrate Finland more directly into the dynamics of NATO-Russia nuclear deterrence, which Finland needs to be capable of managing. ֍

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By Andreas Turunen
Mellenion

Introduction

Early observations from the war between the United States and Iran have again demonstrated the effectiveness of one-way attack unmanned aerial systems (OWA UAS). In this conflict, OWA UAS platforms have been employed against U.S. military installations located on the territory of their Middle Eastern allies. Iran’s use of OWA UAS, particularly its Shahed-drone, has been extensive, with the United Arab Emirates alone reportedly facing nearly 500–700 OWA strike drones directed at vital targets on its soil.

If this trend continues over the course of the war, the Western analytical community can say with increasing certainty that long-range strike drones will remain a consistent element of modern warfare.

In a previous article, I examined Russia’s limitations in achieving aerospace dominance in a hypothetical scenario in which Russia invades the Baltic States. In this piece, I turn to what may be the most obvious strength in Russia’s inventory: the use of long-range strike UAVs. These systems are costly to intercept, difficult to destroy on the ground, and capable of causing significant damage when they reach their targets. Their effectiveness is particularly consequential against vulnerable objectives such as critical civilian infrastructure.

The conduct of long-range drone warfare

In Ukraine, Russia has employed Geran-drones (the Russian version of the Iranian Shahed) on a large scale to degrade Ukraine’s military and civilian infrastructure. According to British military intelligence, Russia launched 55,000 OWA UAS during 2025. This represented a five-fold increase in the use of OWA UAS compared with the previous year, 2024.

The Western approach to conducting air and missile defence traditionally treats interception as a measure of last resort. Defensive systems are expected to engage incoming threats only if the adversary’s strike systems have not been destroyed on the ground prior to launch.

For Ukraine, achieving such ground kills against the Geran OWA UAS has proven difficult. This constraint stems largely from Ukraine’s inability to achieve aerospace supremacy and to develop an air-to-ground strike capability sufficient to degrade the launch platforms of long-range strike drones on the ground.

In the war in Ukraine, the proliferation of long-range strike drones became widespread largely because Russia was unable to achieve air supremacy. Therefore, Russia had to increase its long range drone strike capability. As a result of the extensive use of OWA UAS by Russia, Ukraine has developed one of the most sophisticated and layered approaches to countering the threat to its critical infrastructure. This approach also incorporates a range of improvised and adaptive methods, including the use of helicopters, fighter aircraft, electronic warfare, and interceptor drones.

Achieving a near-total interception rate against Russian long-range OWA UAS drones presents a considerable challenge for Western militaries for several reasons:

1. The very long operational range of the Geran-2 system, estimated at 1,800–2,500 kilometres, makes it difficult for Western air forces to destroy these systems on the ground on a sufficient scale.
   

2. The relatively small size, manoeuvrability, and rack-based launch platforms make the Geran system difficult for Western ISR units to locate.
   

3. Russia possesses considerable strategic depth, allowing it to conduct well-concealed launches and to disperse launchers effectively across its territory.

The difficulty of intercepting Shahed-Geran-type drones has reportedly also been acknowledged by officials in the US administration. According to CNN, US interception systems are not capable of intercepting all incoming drones because their flight characteristics make them more difficult to counter than ballistic missiles in certain circumstances.

Assessment

In Ukraine, Russia has degraded the country’s overall energy production through sustained and massed long-range strikes, the majority of which have been conducted using long-range OWA UAS drones.

In a war against Russia, European critical infrastructure and industrial facilities would be vulnerable to a sustained and massed long-range strike drone campaign. This vulnerability extends across the spectrum of critical infrastructure, meaning that most critical infrastructure could be targeted, unless located underground.

These include:

• Energy systems: generation (thermal and hydro), transmission and distribution infrastructure (substations, transformers, and lines), as well as gas and oil nodes.

• Water and municipal services: water supply systems, district heating networks, and other essential services tied to utilities.

• Transport, logistics, and connectivity: railways, ports and grain-export infrastructure, logistics hubs, telecommunications and digital networks.

The effects of targeting critical infrastructure are societal and, in wartime, are intended to erode the will of the population to resist. To mitigate this threat, European countries and businesses have the advantage of being able to observe and learn from Ukraine’s layered counter-drone defence.

For Russia, long-range strike drones have become an essential component of modern warfare. Russian strategy seeks to degrade Ukraine’s military and economic potential through widespread attacks against critical infrastructure and military targets. This approach is intended to force Ukraine’s capitulation and subjugation to Russian political objectives. In any future conflict involving another European state, it is reasonable to expect that this approach will be repeated and further developed. The threat should therefore be regarded as persistent. ֍

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By Juuso Eskonmaa
Mellenion

Russia’s Minister of Defence outlined a framework for developing the country’s future military capabilities on 17 December 2025. In his address, Belousov presented the main directions of the State Armament Programme (Государственная программа вооружения) for 2027–2036. The programme defines Russia’s military procurement priorities for the next decade, based on assessments of future armed conflicts and military threats.

The speech also signalled a shift in procurement philosophy. According to Belousov:

“The State Armament Programme must be formed on the basis of requirements for the prospective combat capabilities of the Armed Forces, rather than on the number of items of weapons and equipment.”

Belousov frames the Russian Ministry of Defence’s priority for the coming years as modernising the Armed Forces and raising their technological level. To achieve this, the State Armament Programme will prioritise modern, high-technology systems related to strategic nuclear forces, air and missile defence, and space-based capabilities. Electronic warfare, command-and-control, and unmanned systems are also included in the priority list. He states that nearly half of the State Armament Programme’s funding will be allocated to these high-priority categories.

This article continues my analysis of Belousov’s address from 17 December 2025. The first part examined what the remarks suggested about Russia’s priorities in the war in Ukraine; you can read it here.

A capability-based procurement philosophy

The change in procurement priorities, from quantitative goals to capability-based procurement, is the most important shift indicated in the speech.

Belousov illustrates this approach with three examples of priority capability requirements meant to guide the development of the Russian Armed Forces:

• For the Strategic Nuclear Forces, the priority is the ability to overcome the missile defence system of a potential adversary.

• For air defence, the priority capability is repelling aerial attacks.

• For space assets, the priority is ensuring detailed intelligence, high-speed communications, and providing navigation data for the use of high-precision munitions.

Publicly identified by Belousov as priorities, these capabilities are likely to shape the strategic focus and military procurement of the Russian Armed Forces over the coming decade.

Overcoming the missile defence system of a potential adversary

The requirement for the Strategic Nuclear Forces to overcome a potential adversary’s missile defence system is directly connected to Russia’s system of strategic deterrence. A central concept in Russian deterrence doctrine is the ability to inflict “unacceptable damage” (неприемлемый ущерб) on an opponent in a large-scale war.

Russia’s nuclear modernisation efforts are shaped in part by long-standing concerns that U.S. ballistic missile defence could erode the credibility of its retaliatory capability. Preserving an assured and credible nuclear second-strike capability therefore remains a central priority for the Russian Armed Forces, with the United States as the primary strategic adversary.

Russia is likely to invest in sustained efforts to bypass missile defences. Previously, Russia’s nuclear modernisation programme has included continued development and upgrading of intercontinental ballistic missiles of the Yars family, as well as the development of hypersonic glide vehicles such as the “Avangard” system, which has greater manoeuvrability in flight. It has also included Burevestnik, a nuclear-powered, nuclear-armed land-attack cruise missile with intercontinental range, whose actual capabilities and viability remain in question.

In the naval domain, Russia is developing Poseidon, a nuclear-powered, nuclear-armed autonomous underwater system intended to threaten coastal targets while bypassing existing missile-defence systems. However, it is unlikely Poseidon is currently operational.

This dynamic is also linked to ongoing efforts in the United States to develop next-generation layered missile-defence architectures, referred to as the Golden Dome by the US administration. Although this capability remains largely conceptual, such systems are intended to intercept ballistic, hypersonic, and cruise missiles in flight and may influence the strategic balance over the next decade.

From Moscow’s perspective, expanding missile defence architectures could increase pressure to preserve penetration capability, potentially including means to disrupt space-based sensors through electronic warfare, cyber means, or other counter-space capabilities. This might influence the systems developed and procured under the State Armament Programme.

The air defence as a central priority

Air and missile defence are prioritised within the procurement programme. The war in Ukraine has demonstrated a sharp increase in the scale and frequency of aerial attacks, particularly through the widespread use of unmanned aerial vehicles of varying ranges and payloads alongside cruise missiles. Russian planners are likely to expect this trend to persist and expand in future conflicts, reinforcing the emphasis on strengthening air-defence capabilities in the State Armament Programme.

Roughly 80 percent of NATO firepower is air delivered, which helps explain why air-defence systems remain a critical priority for Russia in any potential conflict with NATO. The experiences from the war in Ukraine, together with assessments of NATO air-strike capabilities, are likely to be defining factors in prioritising air defence in military procurement.

The emphasis on air defence is likely to be reflected in the development of the Ground Forces, whose air-defence units are designed to protect manoeuvring formations. Another critical capability is strategic air defence, operated by the Russian Aerospace Forces, which is designed to provide wide-area coverage and protect strategically important military installations and critical infrastructure.

When outlining priorities in strategic air defence, Belousov described in his speech the creation of a PVO-PRO division within the Russian Aerospace Forces, integrating air- and missile-defence capabilities within a single formation. He stated that the first regiment has entered operational duty. Its principal system is the S-500 SAM system, which reportedly can engage targets in near space.

The objective of “forming a universal air-defence system” (формирование универсальной системы противовоздушной обороны) has been linked to the forthcoming State Armament Programme. This formulation did not appear in Belousov’s Collegium speech but was attributed to President Vladimir Putin in remarks reported from a separate meeting related to defence procurement. Information about the “universal” air-defence system remains limited, but the phrasing is worth examination.

The term formation (формирование) used in this context likely refers to organising or integrating existing capabilities and systems. The phrase therefore appears to indicate an objective of integrating and harmonising air- and missile-defence assets into a more unified air-defence network.

This approach would be consistent with broader trends in Russian military thought, including efforts to build integrated command-and-control architectures under the concept of a “Unified Information Space” (Единое информационное пространство), aimed at linking sensors, targeting data, and automated decision-support systems across the Russian Armed Forces.

Expansion of space-based capabilities

Belousov identifies space assets as a priority capability requirement for the State Armament Programme. They are intended to provide detailed intelligence, high-speed communications, and navigation data to enable long-range precision strikes. Within the outlined capability-based planning framework, these capabilities are seen as critical enablers for the Russian Armed Forces, supporting long-range strikes that are increasingly central in Russian military thinking for generating strategic effects.

One of the key surprises for Russian military planners in the war in Ukraine has been the information and intelligence advantage Ukraine has been able to achieve with the help of Western countries. The space-based intelligence and communications capabilities that the United States and European countries have provided to Ukraine have been employed effectively for high-precision strikes against Russian forces and assets in occupied territory, in the Black Sea, and deep inside Russian territory. Russian planners are likely to view NATO’s advantages in this sphere as a priority gap to narrow through the development and procurement of new space-based assets.

Expanding space-based capabilities would also support the integration of air and missile defence and strategic deterrence. Russia appears to be pursuing a more resilient space architecture capable of sustaining communications, navigation, and sensors in a contested environment. From the perspective of the Russian Ministry of Defence, this is likely a critical component of Russia’s ability to remain competitive in high-technology conflicts over the next decade and beyond.

Conclusion

The priorities Belousov outlined point to a State Armament Programme centered on strategic capabilities rather than numerical objectives. The implied reference case for deterrence and warfighting remains a large-scale war against the US and NATO, and the capability requirements he chose to highlight are consistent with this scenario.

From Moscow’s perspective, credible deterrence and warfighting in such a conflict depend on maintaining the effectiveness of the Strategic Nuclear Forces, building a more integrated air and missile defence architecture, and enabling long-range precision strike through space-based intelligence, communications, and navigation support. These themes suggest that the upcoming State Armament Programme is designed to strengthen Russia’s ability to operate in a contested aerospace environment and generate strategic effects at long-ranges.

At the same time, an emphasis on high-technology and innovation at the rhetorical level does not rule out Ground Forces rearmament. Russia is likely to continue procuring and modernising ground-force equipment, including armoured platforms, as it rebuilds and reorganises formations after the war in Ukraine. The establishment of Leningrad and Moscow Military Districts, and the expansion of their units into divisional structures, creates demands that the procurement programme will have to address.

However, the Ground Forces and the whole Armed Forces effectiveness in modern warfare increasingly depends on enabling capabilities: electronic warfare, layered air defences, resilient communications, and space-based reconnaissance and targeting. In addition, equipping and scaling the Unmanned Systems Troops should be expected as a priority.

Whether the State Armament Programme translates into real capabilities will likely depend on the trajectory and outcome of the war in Ukraine, as well as Russia’s economic capacity, defence-industry labour constraints, the depth of its technological manufacturing base, and the effects of sanctions and supply-chain restrictions.

The State Armament Programme is still in its formative phase, but the main directions are already visible in strategic signalling: capability-based planning, prioritisation of strategic systems, and a push toward integrated aerospace defence and space-assets enabling long-range precision strike. They are indicators of how Russia intends to fight and conduct deterrence in the 2030s, and they warrant sustained attention as the programme moves from intent to implementation. ֍

The full transcript and video of the speech are available in Russian, published by the Kremlin: http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/78801.

By Andreas Turunen
Mellenion

The conduct of air war by the Russian Aerospace Forces in Ukraine has been often interpreted by Western experts as an operational failure. The central argument is that Russia has been unable to acquire air supremacy over Ukraine, having failed to destroy Ukraine’s air force and air defences. Since air power is widely regarded as the entry ticket to modern warfare, this assessment has become critical to Western audiences evaluating the current and future threat posed by the Russian Aerospace Forces against Western militaries.

Yet no shared view has emerged within Western analytical communities regarding the precise shortcomings of the Russian Aerospace Forces in Ukraine. This debate is directly relevant to frequently discussed scenarios in which the Russian Armed Forces invade the Baltic States. According to some recent assessments, Russia could conduct a sudden invasion and secure control over Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. After the initial operation, it could threaten NATO with nuclear weapons and pressure political leadership not to invoke Article 5 and to initiate a common response.

In reality, Russia would not enjoy a significant advantage in challenging NATO through an invasion of the Baltic States. The primary risk for Moscow lies in the relative weakness of the Russian Aerospace Forces when measured against stronger, modern and joint-capable NATO air forces. In a real combat situation, Russia would risk losing air supremacy from the earliest stages of conflict and would eventually be unable to protect its ground forces from Western air power.

Russia’s Approach to Air Warfare in the Baltic States

It is often argued that the poor performance of the Russian Aerospace Forces in the initial stages of the war in Ukraine resulted from flawed or insufficient intelligence provided by Russian intelligence and security services. A second explanation suggests that the Russian Aerospace Forces Staff was incapable of proper planning, leading to the inability of Operational-Tactical Aviation to degrade Ukraine’s air defences effectively.

However, Russian military thinkers had already recognised before the war that the Russian Aerospace Forces were incapable of conducting a large-scale air and air defence operation in a regional war. Russian air and air defence doctrinal thinking differs markedly from the Western perspective, being rooted in the support of ground warfare in an operational direction. It is therefore possible that the Russian Aerospace Forces did not pursue an air operation aligned with Western standards, because such standards do not exist in Russian doctrine.

One key characteristic of the war in Ukraine, as described by Russian military thinkers, has been the supremacy of air defences over aircraft. Since the start of the war, the Russian Aerospace Forces have adapted by prioritising the protection of airframes and avoiding entry into Ukraine’s air defence zones, primarily provided by Western partners.

These conclusions carry two consequences:

First, the future role of Operational-Tactical Aviation may be reduced to serving as a launch platform for long-range precision munitions and missiles from within Russia’s own air defence coverage.

Second, in the reconstruction of the Russian Armed Forces after the War in Ukraine, strengthening strategic air defence may be prioritised over investment in aerial platforms.

A hypothetical future war between NATO and the Russian Armed Forces beginning in the Baltic region would not resemble the war in Ukraine. Based on lessons learned, a revised Russian air and air defence approach to support an invasion of the Baltic States would likely include several characteristics.

A strategic air defence-centric approach would see Russia concentrate long-range strategic air defence assets close to the Baltic States and extend the maximum range of systems to cover Baltic airspace.

Operational-Tactical Aviation would play a limited role, avoiding NATO air defence engagement zones and remaining within Russian strategic air defence coverage while launching long-range air-to-air and air-to-ground munitions from distance.

Russia would also increase emphasis on reconnaissance-strike capabilities and unmanned systems, conducting joint strikes from air, ground and sea-based assets alongside long-range drones of the Unmanned Systems Troops. The primary targets would be air bases, logistical hubs and command centres of NATO member states in the Baltic Sea region.

Factors Affecting the Outcome of a Potential Invasion

The first limitation Russia would face is numerical. Some estimates suggest that approximately 250–300 Operational-Tactical Aviation aircraft are currently allocated to the War in Ukraine. Any hostile action against NATO would require significantly more combat-capable aircraft, not only to contest airspace over the Baltic States but also to deter and repel strikes against the Kola peninsula, the Saint Petersburg area, Kaliningrad, Moscow and Belarus. By comparison, the Nordic states alone, all members of NATO, possess more than 200 modern combat aircraft.

The second obstacle concerns qualitative advantage. NATO countries in the Baltic Sea region operate well-integrated air and air defence systems with established joint operability between platforms and nations. The Agile Combat Employment (ACE) concept enables rapid and flexible projection of allied air power.

Western air forces field a considerable number of technologically advanced aircraft, including fourth- and fifth-generation fighters with the latest life-cycle upgrades and stealth-capable platforms. To challenge this, Russia would require not merely greater numbers but specifically its most capable fighter aviation aircraft, including Su-35S (FLANKER-M), Su-30SM2 (FLANKER-H) and Su-57 (FELON). Outdated systems would have negligible impact against modern NATO aircraft due to inferior radars and air-to-air missiles.

The same dynamic applies to strategic air defence. In Western defence discourse, the concept of layered air defence under the designation A2/AD (Anti-Access/Area-Denial) is often depicted through maximum-range engagement zones spanning the Baltic States, implying that Russia could deny NATO air operations in the region.

In practice, strategic air defence systems cannot maintain impenetrable denial zones indefinitely without risking suppression and destruction by Western long-range high-precision munitions. All air defence systems are inherently vulnerable to long-range precision strike; they do not require direct overflight to be neutralised.

To preserve high-value systems such as the S-400, Russia would need to position them beyond the range of Western ground-based launch systems, including ATACMS and MLRS. This would reduce their effective coverage significantly, limiting their capacity to threaten NATO air forces over Baltic airspace.

In addition, US air strikes against Iran’s nuclear programme provided evidence of the capability of stealth-capable fighters to conduct suppression of enemy air defence (SEAD) and operate within monitored airspace.

A significant threat to Western air forces would nonetheless arise from Russian long-range strike capabilities, including ground-based missile systems and the Unmanned Systems Troops. Since the beginning of the War in Ukraine, Russia has refined its conduct of strikes by combining missile and drone attacks in coordinated efforts.

Western air forces, however, possess countermeasures. Strategic depth and dispersed runways enable flexible deployment. Air-to-air refuelling mitigates range and payload constraints, enabling strikes from longer distances. Airborne interception can neutralise missiles and drones in flight, while Western air-to-ground capabilities allow strikes against launch positions before munitions are fired.

Information and intelligence superiority, as acknowledged by both Western and Russian analysts, would further complicate Russian preparations. Concentrating sufficient ground, air and sea-based assets without detection would be difficult under sustained monitoring of Russian military activity.

During the preparatory stages of the war in Ukraine, the United States provided detailed public information concerning Russian intentions. A similar pattern would likely emerge if Russia began deploying forces near the Baltic States. This would afford Western air forces time to reinforce the region, deter aggression and contest air supremacy from the outset.

Another limiting factor for Russia is Western standoff air-to-ground strike capability, which differs markedly from Ukraine’s. Russian military experts recognise that Western air forces possess a wide range of precision-guided munitions capable of targeting the ground infrastructure of the Russian Aerospace Forces.

In practical terms, Russia would need to calculate carefully from what distance Operational-Tactical Aviation could operate without risking catastrophic losses in the early stages of conflict. Increased distance from the frontline would reduce available time on station and payload for missions such as sustained air patrols with full missile loads.

Outcome and Conclusion

Russia would face a significant risk of military defeat in any invasion scenario against the Baltic States due to the disparity in air power between NATO and the Russian Aerospace Forces. A rapid advance supported by long-range strikes and drones would likely encounter well-prepared and superior Western air forces capable of achieving air supremacy and degrading Russian combat potential both at the frontline and in the rear.

Misunderstandings about the limitations of Western air power partly reflect experiences from Afghanistan and Iraq, where extensive air-to-ground strikes against low-priority targets revealed limitations in asymmetric warfare contexts. Modern Western air power, however, is designed for confrontation with conventional armed forces, targeting weapon platforms, organisations, command and control systems and combat support elements.

The NATO and Russian views on the conventional balance of power in the aerospace domain are largely aligned. Both consider the aerospace domain decisive in contemporary and future warfare and understand that NATO holds superiority in this domain. The divergence lies primarily in political and public discourse in the West, where perceptions of vulnerability in conventional warfare against Russia are persistent. ֍

By Juuso Eskonmaa
Mellenion

The Russian Minister of Defence, Andrey Belousov, argues that combat operations in Ukraine have undergone a significant shift.

He emphasises four trends: (1) drones and FPV drones as the primary tactical strike systems; (2) Ukraine’s “drone wall,” which is pushing Russian forces to rely more on mobility and electronic warfare (EW) during offensive actions; (3) greater emphasis on shared situational awareness at tactical and operational levels; and (4) an increase in the tempo and scale of Ukrainian deep strikes into Russia.

This analysis is based on the speech by Belousov from December 17, 2025, when Russia’s military and political leadership convened in Moscow for the Expanded Meeting of the Ministry of Defence (MoD) Collegium. In this speech, Belousov outlined the primary trends in the war and priorities for 2026. The speech appears to have received limited attention in Western coverage and analytical communities.

Increasing reliance on drones in combat

A key takeaway from the speech concerns the large-scale use of drones and their decisive role in combat.

The official position in the leadership of the Russian MoD increasingly reflects the central role of drones in modern warfare. Belousov argues that drones have assumed the role of the primary strike element in the war in Ukraine, rather than a supporting element. Their use in reconnaissance and strike missions is described as having grown significantly. He also stresses the role of drones in reconnaissance, counter-battery fire, and targeting deliveries of ammunition and supplies to the front.

Based on the elements highlighted by the leadership of the Russian MoD, a central challenge is creating drones capable of reconnaissance and strike actions in a tightly contested environment in which EW, counter-drone, and air defence capabilities are present at scale.

Belousov presents this shift as being institutionalised, framing the creation of the Unmanned Systems Troops as a core development in this sphere. A goal for 2026 at the Russian MoD and Armed Forces is the integration of Unmanned Systems Troops into the organisational structures of the wider Armed Forces.

The creation of the Unmanned Systems Troops at the end of 2025 indicates that the current reliance on drones is not a temporary battlefield adaptation driven by operational pressures, but an integral part of longer-term efforts to develop Russian force structure and capabilities.

Russian offensives rely on mobility and electronic warfare

Russian MoD leadership describes Ukrainian forces as aiming to slow Russian advances and inflict casualties on assaulting units by establishing what is described as a “line of drones”: a zone approximately 10–15 kilometres deep.

Because Belousov makes this a core element of his description of the war, I read the emergence of a Ukrainian drone-dominated ‘kill zone’ as contributing to a shift in Russian military thinking. A deep, adaptive drone wall reduces opportunities for rapid manoeuvre and the exploitation of breakthroughs. The zone of constant surveillance and routine reconnaissance-strike drone activity complicates attempts at combined arms manoeuvre and limits the Russian use of armoured platforms, including tanks and IFVs.

As described by Belousov, the primary Russian response has been an emphasis on mobility and EW protection for front-line units. One attempted solution has been to increase mobility through the widespread distribution of motorcycles and other light vehicles. Protection of assault troops has increasingly centred on EW. The mass deployment of localised EW systems indicates that electronic protection against drones is increasingly treated as a baseline requirement for survival, rather than a specialised capability.

Systems such as Obereg («Оберег»), Peroed («Пероед»), Silok («Силок») and Sosedka («Соседка») are designed to jam or suppress drones’ communications and control links at the tactical level. The official numbers provided by Belousov claim that more than 130,000 counter-drone EW systems were delivered to the forward areas in 2025. Further increases in EW density are identified as a priority task for 2026.

Integration of command and control

Another change in Russian combat operations is described as an increased emphasis on informational awareness at the tactical and operational levels. This is related to the framing of command and control integration as a core combat capability.

The stated objective is the creation of a unified and secure command-and-control environment covering force structures from the platoon to the brigade and division (соединение) level, enabling troops to access various digital services. The services mentioned include a shared tactical and aerial situation, satellite imagery, meteorological data, and geospatial information.

The system behind this integration is titled Svod («Свод»), a networked command-and-control system designed to enable shared situational awareness across formations. According to Belousov, the system has completed testing within the Grouping of Forces “Centre” (группировка войск «Центр»). The stated objective is to deploy it across all groupings of forces engaged in the war by September 2026.

Despite Belousov’s ambitious goals, the aspirations related to command and control integration are unlikely to be achieved in the short term. Such reforms are difficult to implement even under peacetime conditions, and far more challenging during continuous attritional warfare across a frontline extending for over a thousand kilometres.

The changes to command and control systems are therefore likely to be incremental. Even so, these efforts point to an identified deficiency within the Russian military system, as well as an articulated vision for addressing it.

Ukraine has achieved success in deep strikes into Russia

Belousov considers the expansion of Ukrainian strikes deep into Russia, in both intensity and scale, to be the fourth primary development of the war. According to the numbers provided, from the beginning of 2025 Ukrainians managed to conduct 1,500 long-range UAV strikes per month, increasing to 3,700 per month from May 2025 onwards.

Based on the speech, I would argue that protection from drones through increasing the density of EW and air defence systems in Russian formations is likely to be a key priority for Russian procurement in 2026. Belousov sets a goal of strengthening the forward zone and rear areas with air and missile defence capabilities to intercept long-range drones and cruise missiles.

The priority air defence systems are Pantsir («Панцирь») combat vehicles and other short- and medium-range SAM (surface-to-air missile) systems. Mobile fire teams are highlighted and their primary counter-UAV weapon systems are described as MANPADS Verba («Верба») and air-defence complexes Zubr and Citadel («Зубр» and «Цитадель»). In addition, the Russians are deploying interceptor FPV drones, aiming to increase their use in the first half of 2026.

Conclusions

As the war enters its fifth year on February 24, the speech of the Russian Minister of Defence is significant in its contents. Drones have become the primary strike component, and the struggle for drone supremacy is a vital element in how the leadership of the Russian MoD views the ongoing war. This battle is waged through the constant development of new types of drones, counter-drone technologies, electronic warfare capabilities, and increasingly dense air defence networks. These capabilities are increasingly presented as prerequisites for survival on the battlefield.

Compared with the sustained attention given to unmanned systems, electronic warfare, air defence, and secure networked command-and-control, the speech gives relatively less emphasis to armoured manoeuvre and mechanised warfare as priorities in adaptation or procurement.

The speech by the Russian Minister of Defence serves a specific institutional function. It is intended to define priorities, issue guidance, and articulate the official position of the Russian military-political leadership, as well as to foreign audiences. The content can therefore be interpreted as institutional signalling, highlighting the doctrinal and procurement priorities of the Russian MoD.

The change in the nature of Russian thinking about the war is likely persistent rather than temporary. The lessons from the war in Ukraine are being institutionalised in new force structures, such as the Unmanned Systems Troops, and disseminated inside the Russian Armed Forces. The learning is likely to continue after the end of the war in Ukraine. The lessons from the war can be expected to have an impact on the State Armament Programme and the development of force structures inside the Russian Armed Forces. ֍

The full transcript and video of the speech is available in Russian, published by the Kremlin: http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/78801.

The figures cited are reported as Russian MoD claims and should be treated as unverified.

By Juuso Eskonmaa
Mellenion

The war in Ukraine has drawn attention to the performance of Russian naval forces, particularly in the Black Sea. Less visible, but strategically more consequential, has been the reorganisation of the Russian Navy’s command structure. Russian military authorities assessed that the Joint Strategic Command (JSC) system and the regional subordination of fleets to military districts created an ineffective system for the employment of naval forces under wartime conditions. This appears to have prompted the need for organisational reform.

The changes are the most far-reaching in the Northern Fleet. Stripped of Joint Strategic Command (JSC) and military district status as well as territorial administrative responsibilities, the restructuring is intended to focus the Northern Fleet on its core missions in the Arctic Ocean. Although sometimes mischaracterised as a downgrade, the reform reflects an institutional effort to remove secondary administrative burdens and concentrate naval forces on warfighting and deterrence in the High North.

The Joint Strategic Commands

Russia reformed the organisation of its armed forces in 2010 by establishing four Joint Strategic Commands (JSCs) on the foundation of the existing military districts. The intent was to create standing, permanent joint commands capable of independently assessing the threat environment, mobilising forces, and conducting combat operations. Each command was designed to exercise unified command over all troops and formations within its area of responsibility in both peacetime and wartime.

In practice, this subordinated Ground Forces, Air Force, and Navy assets to regional JSC headquarters, embedding air and naval forces within predominantly land-centric command structures.

The JSC Northern Fleet, established in 2014, represented a departure from this model. It was the only JSC built around a fleet rather than a land-focused military district. It initially lacked formal military district status and territorial administrative responsibilities compared to the other JSCs. From the outset, the JSC Northern Fleet was treated as an experimental formation intended to assess whether a fleet-based JSC could effectively defend Russia’s Arctic region.

Its creation reflected the growing strategic importance of the Arctic and an attempt to impose centralised command of military capabilities in a region that did not fit neatly within the traditional military district framework.

The experimental command structure was most likely judged successful, since further changes were made by a presidential decree in 2020 that designated the Northern Fleet as a “joint strategic territorial formation of the Russian Armed Forces fulfilling the tasks of a military district”, effective from 1 January 2021.

A separate decree defined the command’s territorial administrative boundaries as Murmansk and Arkhangelsk Oblasts, the Republic of Komi, and the Nenets Autonomous Okrug.

With this step, the Northern Fleet increased in status and was formally integrated into Russia’s military-administrative framework as a fifth military district with defined territorial responsibilities.

The Centralisation of the Fleets Under the Navy Command

During the war in Ukraine, Russian military authorities judged the existing command structure to be ineffective and in need of a correction. Russia’s military-administrative boundaries were redefined with a presidential decree in February 2024, dissolving the Western Military District and establishing the Leningrad and Moscow Military Districts in its place.

As part of the broader reforms in 2024-2025, the military districts lost their joint status, and the JSCs were converted into the military district headquarters, reflecting the removal of Russian Navy and Aerospace Forces formations from the military district structures. These air and naval forces were subordinated to Commanders-in-Chief of the respective service branches.

The Northern Fleet itself was stripped of both military district and JSC status. Instead, the Northern Fleet was designated as an operational-strategic formation and placed under the command of the Russian Navy, in a similar way to the other fleets. As part of the reform, the territories previously under the military administration of the JSC Northern Fleet were transferred to the recently established Leningrad Military District.

According to the then Russian Minister of Defence Sergei Shoigu, direct subordination of the fleets to the Russian Navy would allow the service branch to “effectively manage the Navy and the fleets” and introduce “unified approaches to operational planning and training under modern conditions”.

An unnamed military official similarly stated that the reform was intended to remove fleets and flotillas from their previous dual subordination to the JSCs and the Russian Navy. The same reporting noted intentions to establish a Navy Staff management group in Moscow to exercise direct operational control, citing the ineffectiveness of the former command system as the primary driver for change.

Strategic and Operational Consequences of the Reforms

The Russian Navy has been forced to adapt to modern naval warfare against Ukraine, which has demonstrated an ability to conduct long-range drone and missile strikes, employ intelligence and reconnaissance assets effectively, and generate continuous tactical and operational surprises.

The lessons drawn from these losses have been costly, but they are now expected to form a central reference point for how Russia intends to develop its naval forces. I would argue that the centralisation of the fleets under the Navy Command is intended to enable these lessons to be processed at the institutional level and implemented in a unified manner across the fleets of the Russian Navy.

A further driver of the reform is likely the need to employ the Russian Navy in a more concentrated and flexible way. Unified operational planning and centralised command, as described by the Russian authorities, could enable the transfer and employment of naval assets between different theatres more effectively. This is likely intended to allow a more flexible transfer, concentration, and employment of the Russian naval assets for operations between different maritime and oceanic regions.

This logic primarily concerns the Pacific Fleet and the Northern Fleet, which are better able to transfer assets between theatres through the Northern Sea Route. By contrast, the Black Sea and Baltic Fleets are geographically constrained by the Turkish and Danish straits, limiting their ability to flexibly reinforce other fleets.

In addition, the JSC structure likely created cultural frictions and inefficient force employment by combining assets from different service branches under predominantly land-oriented regional commands. In practice, fleets received tasks and guidance from both the regional JSC headquarters and the Navy Staff, creating friction and ambiguity in command relationships. Meanwhile, the JSC Northern Fleet was likely not the most effective command structure to manage its subordinated land components.

Compared to the previous system of dual subordination between the JSCs and the Navy, the reforms are intended to streamline and improve command and control of Russia’s fleets. Centralisation might allow the Russian naval forces to operate in a concentrated manner according to national-level perceptions of interests and threats rather than being influenced by regional priorities of the military districts.

Although the Northern Fleet has been downgraded from a military district and a JSC to an operational-strategic formation under the Russian Navy, these changes should not be interpreted as a decline in importance of the fleet. Instead, the changes are intended to improve efficiency and unity of command, and allow a focus on the Northern Fleet’s core missions: Arctic defence, protection of Russia’s maritime interests, and supporting the strategic deterrence mission of the Russian Armed Forces. ֍